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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I. INTRODUCTION
This criminal procedure survey covers cases appearing in the Bar Bulletin
between January 1988 and July 1989. The article initially follows the

order of a criminal proceeding, surveying cases that do not involve
constitutional issues but relate to trial procedure and sentencing; the
article then circles back and surveys cases analyzing particular constitutional provisions. The article concludes with a discussion of State v.
Clark,1 a case we found the most interesting of the survey period. Clark
involves significant death penalty and eighth amendment issues.
II. PRETRIAL PROCEDURES
Defendants' challenges to pretrial procedures failed in the following
noteworthy cases from the survey year. In balancing individual rights

against the state's interest in prosecution, the court was reluctant to
dismiss at the initial stages.
A. Grand Jury Practice
In State v. Hewitt,2 the defendant unsuccessfully challenged the prosecution's conduct in grand jury proceedings. The function of the grand
jury is to investigate and find probable cause, not to adjudicate; thus,
the defendant cannot invoke the full range of due process rights available
at trial.'
The role of the grand jury presents a natural tension between the
determination of probable cause and the protection of citizens from
abusive prosecution. 4 New Mexico courts prefer to resolve mistakes by
trial on the merits rather than to interfere with the finding of probable
cause.' "In general, only flagrant cases of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct resulting
in demonstrable prejudice have resulted in dismissal of
6
indictments."

1. 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 291 (1989).
2. 108 N.M. 179, 769 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1988).
3. In Re Grand Jury Sandoval County, 106 N.M. 764, 768, 750 P.2d 464, 468 (Ct. App. 1988).
One significant difference between trial and grand jury proceedings is the more lenient evidentiary
standard allowed in grand jury investigations. Evidence presented to a grand jury is not reviewable
absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecuting attorney. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §
31-6-11 (1978).
4. Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 696, 634 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1981). In Buzbee, the supreme
court presented a complete exposition of the interplay between the common law and New Mexico's
statutory law of grand jury proceedings. Id. at 695-98, 634 P.2d 1247-50.
5. "We hold that opening up indictments for challenge would halt the orderly progress of
investigations, would cause extended litigation on unimportant issues and -would frustrate the public's
interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws." Id. at 706, 634 P.2d at
1258. The due process questions raised by prosecutorial discretion are problematic, as evidenced by
the significant dissent in Buzbee. Id. at 707-12, 634 P.2d at 1259-64 (Sosa, J., and Wood, J.,
dissenting).
6. State v. Velasquez, 99 N.M. 109, 112, 654 P.2d 562, 565 (Ct. App. 1982).
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Hewitt challenged the prosecutors' refusal to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. The court upheld the prosecution's wide discretion
to determine whether exculpatory evidence must be admitted. 7 In Hewitt,
the trial court had quashed the indictment, finding that the state had
failed to present exculpatory evidence, or alternately, that the two assistant
district attorneys had improperly influenced the grand jury.' The court
of appeals reversed on the basis that there was no showing that the
excluded evidence would have directly negated Hewitt's guilt or changed
the grand jury's judgment on probable cause. 9
While the grand jury was considering the evidence against him, Hewitt
delivered a letter to the grand jury.' 0 The letter stated that Hewitt had
heard rumors he was being investigated and wished to present three
evidentiary exhibits to prove his innocence: a transcript of a taped conversation between him and Benjamin, his accuser; a letter he (Hewitt)
had drafted to the FBI; and the results of a polygraph test he had taken.
These items did not accompany the letter. Upon hearing the letter, jury
members questioned the district attorneys about whether Hewitt had been
properly notified of the proceedings. One of the attorneys stated that
Hewitt and his attorneys of record had been notified by regular mail of
the proceedings. Responding to a jury member's comment that regular
mail provided no assurance of receipt, the attorney indicated that if the
defendant believed he had been prejudiced, he could raise the issue by
motion. The attorney then advised the grand jury to determine whether
to obtain the evidence Hewitt proposed. Deciding not to obtain further
evidence, the grand jury returned the indictment."
Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals found that only one
item, the polygraph test, was admitted into evidence at the hearing on
the motion to dismiss. 12 The polygraph test was not directly exculpatory
because it concerned only one of the charges against Hewitt. a Further,
the letter containing the results was hearsay, and no foundation for the
admissibility of the test results was established because the polygraph
examiner had not been properly qualified as an expert witness and the

7. Hewitt, 108 N.M. at 183, 769 P.2d at 96. The burden of quashing an indictment is on the
defendant. Velasquez, 99 N.M. at 112, 654 P.2d at 565. Evidence before the grand jury is not
subject to review absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor who assisted the
grand jury. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-I1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1984). To quash an indictment based on
the state's failure to present exculpatory evidence, the defendant must satisfy a three-pronged test.
Hewitt, 108 N.M. at 182, 769 P.2d at 95. The defendant must first show that the prosecutor's
acts or omissions were prejudicial. Velasquez, 99 N.M. at 112, 654 P.2d at 565 (citing Buzbee, 96
N.M. at 704, 634 P.2d 1255). Second, the excluded evidence must directly negate the defendant's
guilt. Buzbee, 96 N.M. at 699, 634 P.2d at 1251. Third, the exculpatory evidence must be legally
admissible. Id.
8. Hewitt, 108 N.M. at 180, 769 P.2d at 93.
9. Id. at 185, 769 P.2d at 98.
10. Id. at 181, 769 P.2d at 94.
11. Id. at 182, 769 P.2d at 95.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 183, 769 P.2d at 96.
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accuracy of the tests had not been developed.14 Thus, the court found
no factual basis for the trial court's determination that the excluded
evidence was directly exculpatory and admissible.' 5
The court further determined that the prosecutor's comments to the
grand jury were not prejudicial because the defendant failed to establish
that the prosecutors' answers to jurors' questions both changed the result6
and infringed upon the independent judgment of the grand jurors.1
Generally, trial courts should dismiss only flagrant cases of deliberate
prosecutorial misconduct resulting in demonstrable prejudice. 7 Demonstrable prejudice requires showing that the conduct infringed upon the
independent judgment of the grand jurors and changed the result.'
"Perjury, deceit, or malicious overreaching that subverts a grand jury
proceeding constitutes conduct that infringes upon the independent judgment of the jurors."' 9
In his dissent, Judge Alarid criticized the majority for focusing solely
on whether the evidence was exculpatory instead of fully considering
whether the prosecutors violated their duty to act in a fair and impartial
manner. 0 Judge Alarid also believed the prosecutors' statements "likely
affected the independent judgment of the grand jury," and he would
have upheld the
trial court's implied finding that the result would have
2
been different. '
Two other cases in the survey year presented challenges to grand jury
23
proceedings: In re Grand Jury Sandoval County,22 and State v. Morton.
In In re Grand Jury, the target of a grand jury investigation applied
for a writ of mandamus to compel the district attorney to present certain
evidence, to control the manner of the state's presentation, and to conduct
voir dire examination of the grand jury members.2 4 The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's refusal to issue the writ. The court stated

14. Id. The judge has discretion to allow evidence of a polygraph examination if the test was
administered in accordance with the rules of evidence. SUP. CT. RuLEs ANN. 11-707(C) (Recomp.
1986).
15. Hewitt, 108 N.M. at 183-84, 769 P.2d at 96-97. The court noted that defendant failed to
produce the alleged exculpatory evidence at the motion hearing. Id. at 184, 769 P.2d at 97.
16. Id. at 185, 769 P.2d at 98. The court stated there was testimony which constituted sufficient
evidence of probable cause to indict on the count of larceny, the subject of the polygraph test.
Id.
17. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987); State
v. Velasquez, 99 N.M. 109, 112, 654 P.2d 562, 565 (1988)(both cases cited in Hewitt, 108 N.M.
at 184, 769 P.2d at 97).
18. Hewitt, 108 N.M. at 184, 769 P.2d at 97 (citing Velasquez, 99 N.M. at 112, 654 P.2d at

565).
19. Id. Statements to the grand jury explaining law or procedure are proper unless they are
incorrect or conflict with the grand jury's charge. Id. (citing State v. Ballinger, 99 N.M. 707, 663
P.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 100 N.M. 583, 673 P.2d 1316 (1984) and State
v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 585, 642 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1982)).
20. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-7 (1984) states, in part, "The prosecuting attorney shall conduct
himself in a fair and impartial manner at all times when assisting the grand jury."
21. Hewitt, 108 N.M. at 185-86, 769 P.2d at 98-99 (Alarid, J., dissenting).
22. 106 N.M 764, 750 P.2d 464 (Ct. App. 1988).
23. 107 N.M. 478, 760 P.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1988).
24. 106 N.M. at 765, 750 P.2d at 465.
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that a mandamus writ was inappropriate to control the district attorney
in grand jury proceedings for two reasons: first, the petitioner had other
remedies available, including motions to dismiss or to quash indictment
or a writ of prohibition; second, mandamus could not properly
compel
25
a district attorney, who is given broad discretionary power.
In Morton, the court of appeals considered whether an indictment
must allege aggravating circumstances in order for the state to prosecute
the defendant in a death penalty proceeding. 26 The court held that aggravating circumstances are not elements of the capital felony charged
but are considerations for sentencing following conviction. 2 The indictment, therefore, was sufficient because it recited the crime as a capital
felony and referred to the proper statute.28 Because the defendant was
charged with a capital felony, the defendant was on notice that the court
would consider the aggravating circumstances listed in the capital felony
sentencing provision. 29 The court attached a due process caveat, stating
that the state may have to provide notice of intent to claim aggravating
circumstances prior to trial if it intends to establish aggravating circumstances through evidence admitted at trial. °
B. Pre-Indictment Delay
In State v. Lewis,' the defendant moved to dismiss his indictment on
the basis that he was denied due process because pre-indictment delay
abrogated his fundamental right to a speedy trial.3 2 When the trial court
denied his motion, he pled guilty to the charges, conditioning his plea
on the right to appeal the constitutional issue of speedy trial. The court
33
of appeals affirmed his convictions.
Lewis was arrested for selling amphetamines to undercover narcotics
agents on two separate occasions. The state delayed making the arrest
for nine months after the final sale in order to continue its undercover
operation .34
Pre-indictment delay presents a due process question, rather than a
speedy trial question, because the sixth amendment right to a speedy

25. Id. at 766-67, 750 P.2d at 466-67. Mandamus writs may only be issued when no other timely
and adequate remedy exists, and they may only be issued to mandate the performance of a ministerial,
nondiscretionary duty. Id. at 766, 750 P.2d at 466 (citing, inter alia, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-2-5
(1978); see also id. § 44-2-4).
26. 107 N.M. at 479, 760 P.2d at 171.
27. Id. at 479-80, 760 P.2d at 171-72.
28. Id. at 480, 760 P.2d at 172.
29. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) ("aggravating circumstances
to be considered by the sentencing court or jury")).
30. Id. at 480-81, 760 P.2d 172-73. The state's filing of a notice of intent to claim aggravating
circumstances was sufficient and did not circumvent the grand jury's duty to find probable cause.
Id. at 481, 760 P.2d at 173. The grand jury found probable cause as to the underlying offense
and need not have found probable cause as to aggravating circumstances. Id.
31. 107 N.M. 182, 754 P.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1988).
32. Id. at 183, 754 P.2d at 854.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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trial applies only after the defendant has been indicted, arrested or
accused." The court of appeals rejected Lewis'6 due process claim, applying
the standard established in State v. Jojola1
Since Jojola, the courts have made clear that a defendant must show
37
with substantial certainty that lost evidence would have been exculpatory.
Lewis does not change the analysis. 38 Lewis claimed that witnesses were
unavailable at trial who would have testified he did not transfer any
drugs. 9 The court dismissed this claim as a speculative assertion that a
witness might be useful; the claim did not show actual prejudice. 40 The
court stated that the identity of alibi witnesses was unclear and that the
agents' testimony on the lack of witnesses,
though uncertain, cast doubt
4
on the extent of actual prejudice. '
Because the defendant did not successfully show actual prejudice, the
court did not need to reach the reasonableness of the state's justification
for the delay. The court did complete the analysis, however, holding in
dictum that the state's desire to continue an ongoing undercover operation
for almost nine months was a reasonable basis for delay. 2
C. Speedy Trial: Six-Month Rule
The following cases during the survey year interpreted New Mexico's
rule governing the right to a speedy trial: State v. Mendoza,43 State v.

35. Id. at 184, 754 P.2d at 855. For a discussion of sixth amendment speedy trial issues, see
infra notes 324-46 and accompanying text.
36. 89 N.M. 489, 553 P.2d 1296 (Ct. App. 1976). In Jojola, the court of appeals applied the
standards set forth in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). Due process is violated if preindictment delay causes substantial prejudice to a defendant, and the delay was an intentional device
to gain tactical advantage over the accused. Jojola, 89 N.M. at 490, 553 P.2d at 1297. In Jojola,
the court developed a two-step procedure for determining whether a defendant has been substantially
prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. First, the defendant must show he has suffered actual prejudice
by specifically establishing how his defense would have been more successful had the delay been
shorter. Id. at 491, 553 P.2d at 1298. After the defendant shows actual prejudice, the court must
weigh the actual prejudice against the state's reasons for the delay to determine whether there has
been substantial prejudice. Id. at 490, 553 P.2d at 1297.
37. Jojola itself was a sodomy case delayed 7.5 months. The court rejected as insufficient the
defendant's bald claim that he was prejudiced because he could not remember relevant events. 89
N.M. at 491, 553 P.2d at 1298.
In State v. Grissom, 106 N.M. 555, 746 P.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1987), defendants charged with
business fraud claimed a due process violation because of the state's 16 month delay. Defendants
cited the death of an exculpatory witness. The court found no substantial prejudice because the
trial court was willing to admit testimony given by the witness in relation to another charge prior
to his death. Id. at 566, 746 P.2d at 672. Further, the court indicated that the successful prosecution
of white collar crimes required greater tolerance for delay. Id. at 561, 746 P.2d at 667.
In State v. Duran, 91 N.M. 756, 581 P.2d 19 (1978), defendant claimed a due process violation
because the death of a witness hampered his defense of a larceny charge. The court found that
defendant failed to present what the witness would have testified to and how the testimony would
have exonerated him. When the defendant further complained that the state had established no
reason for the one-year pre-indictment delay, the court indicated that unless there is actual prejudice,
the court need not reach the issue of the state's reason for the delay. Id. at 758, 581 P.2d at 21.
38. 107 N.M. at 184, 754 P.2d at 855.
39. Id. at 185, 754 P.2d at 856.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 185-86, 754 P.2d at 856-57.
43. 108 N.M. 446, 774 P.2d 440 (1989).
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Bishop," and State v. Lucero.45 Although the right to a speedy trial is
grounded in the United States Constitution,4 many states, including New
Mexico, have enacted their own rules to enforce and supplement the
constitutional right. 47 While the courts have traditionally distinguished
between statutory and constitutional speedy trial challenges, the supreme
court's two-tiered analysis in Mendoza indicates48 that constitutional rights
are always implicated and must be examined.
In Mendoza, the supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether
the six-month rule recommences upon a finding of competency following
a stay of proceedings to determine a defendant's competency to stand
trial. 49 The court found these circumstances analogous to the rule permitting the six-month time period to recommence upon a finding of
competency following a stay of proceedings for incompetency. 0 The
supreme court held that because a stay to determine competency was
essentially in the defendant's interest, the stay was chargeable to the

44. 108 N.M. 105, 766 P.2d 1339 (Ct. App. 1988).
45. 108 N.M. 548, 775 P.2d 750 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 108 N.M. 582, 775 P.2d 1299 (1989).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. VI & XIV. New Mexico's constitution also guarantees the right to a
speedy trial. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14. For discussion of constitutional speedy trial challenges in
the survey year, see infra notes 324-46 and accompanying text.
47. New Mexico's District Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 5-604(B) states:
Time limits for commencement of trial. The trial of a criminal case or an habitual
criminal proceeding shall be commenced six (6) months after whichever of the
following events occurs latest:
(1) the date of arraignment, or waiver of arraignment, in the district court of
any defendant;
(2) if the proceedings have been stayed on a finding of incompetency to stand
trial, the date an order is filed finding the defendant competent to stand trial;
(3) if a mistrial is declared or a new trial is ordered by the trial court, the date
such order is filed;
(4) in the event of an appeal, including interlocutory appeals, the date the mandate
or order is filed in the district court disposing of the appeal;
(5) the date of arrest of the defendant for failure to appear;
(6) if the defendant has been placed in a preprosecution diversion program, the
date of the filing with the clerk of the district court of a notice of termination of
a preprosecution diversion program for failure to comply with the terms, conditions
or requirements of such program;
(7) the date the court allows the withdrawal of a plea or the rejection of a plea
made pursuant to Paragraph's A to F of Rule 5-304.
Sup. CT. RuLEs ANN. 5-604(B) (Recomp. 1986). The Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Magistrate
Courts, Metropolitan Court, and Magistrate Courts also specify that
[a] charge . . . which is pending for six (6) months from the date of the arrest
of the defendant or the filing of a complaint or citation against the defendant
. . . without commencement of a trial . . . shall be dismissed without prejudice
unless, after a hearing, the [court] finds that the defendant was responsible ....
Id. 6-506(B), 7-506(B), 8-506(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
48. Mendoza, 108 N.M. at 449, 774 P.2d at 449. In his special concurrence in Mendoza, Justice
Ransom argued that the court should avoid the common appellation of "speedy trial" for both
the rule and the constitutional right and avoid "engrafting principles of constitutional analysis onto
the operation of the rule." Id. at 444, 774 P.2d at 444.
49. Id. at 441, 774 P.2d at 441.
50. Id. at 443, 774 P.2d at 443. See Sup. CT. RuLEs ANN. 5-604(B)(2) and supra note 47.
Defendant's counsel argued, and the trial court and the court of appeals agreed, that since the
inquiry led to a finding that the defendant was competent, the six-month time period was not
recommenced under the plain meaning of Rule 5-604(B)(2). Mendoza, 108 N.M. at 441, 774 P.2d
at 441.
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defendant, and the six-month time period recommenced after a finding
of competency was entered. 5 The court declined to read its rule on
incompetency stays in a literal manner. 2 Although no court rule specifically applied to the defendant's situation, the supreme court held that
recommencement of the six-month period was "consistent with the intent
of the rule, with the interests protected by it, and [was] appropriate in
the present case." '53
In the second tier of its analysis, the court examined the delay in
terms of factors gleaned from cases brought under the sixth amendment
speedy trial guarantee. 4 This tier demands consideration of the length
of delay, reason for the delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant. 5 The court found that the delay was to
protect Mendoza's constitutional rights, that he acquiesed in the delay,
that he only asserted his right after trial commenced, and, that no prejudice
was revealed.1 6 Thus, the court found no violation of Mendoza's right
to a speedy trial. 7 As Justice Ransom objected in his special concurrence,
the court has now effectively merged constitutional analysis with the
speedy trial inquiry under its rules.58
In Bishop, the court clarified the definition of "month" for purposes
of the rule governing the right to a speedy trial.5 9 The court defined a
month as a calendar month 6° and determined that the date the complaint
6
is filed should not be included in computing the rule's period. '
The court in Bishop also analyzed when a defendant waives his right
to rely upon the rule. 62 Bishop was charged in Bernalillo County with
driving while intoxicated and failing to yield the right of way. 6a The case
was set for trial seven times. 64 When the trial finally commenced seven
months after the charges were filed, the court dismissed for failure to
66
prosecute within the six-month time limit. 65 The court of appeals reversed.
During the seven months before trial, Bishop had been granted a thirty-

51. Id. at 443, 774 P.2d at 443.
52. Id. at 443-44, 774 P.2d at 443-44. The court relied, in part, on the "common sense approach"
developed by State v. Flores, 99 N.M. 44, 653 P.2d 875 (1982). Flores explicated what has become
accepted as the established rule of construction for speedy trial questions. Flores held that the
purpose of the rule was "to assure the prompt trial and disposition of criminal cases" and is not
to be technically applied "to effect dismissals." Id. at 46, 653 P.2d at 877.
53. Mendoza, 108 N.M. at 442, 774 P.2d at 442.
54. Id. at 443, 774 P.2d at 443.
55. Id. For further explanation of the constitutional factors, see State v. Chacon, 103 N.M.
288, 289, 706 P.2d 152, 153 (1985).
56. Mendoza, 108 N.M. at 443-44, 774 P.2d at 443-44.
57. Id. at 444, 774 P.2d at 444.
58. Id.
59. 108 N.M. at 107, 766 P.2d at 1341.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 108, 766 P.2d at 1342.
62. Id. at 108-09, 766 P.2d at 1342-43.
63. Id.at 106, 766 P.2d at 1340.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 106, 766 P.2d at 1340. The court analyzed the issue under former Metropolitan Court
Criminal Rule 55(b) which is identical to Sup. CT. RuLEs ANN. 7-506(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
66. Bishop, 108 N.M. at 110, 766 P.2d at 1344.

--0"'!j
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five day continuance by the court. 67 His motion for a continuance included
an express waiver of the six-month rule.6 In appellate argument, however,
Bishop stated that his waiver was limited to the continuance period, that
tolling is not authorized under the rule, and that even though a continuance
had been granted, the trial court had ample opportunity to commence
trial within the statutory period.0 69 Bishop argued that the rule should be
7
strictly construed in his favor.
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the right to a speedy trial
is a right relative to delays, and that if a defendant causes, contributes
or consents to a delay, he may have waived his right. 71 The trial court
must examine the reasons for all delays. 72 If the defendant caused any
delay, the court has the discretion to exclude that period from the sixmonth limitation. 73 The court construed the motion for continuance as
a limited waiver of the running of the time under the six-month rule
for the period of the continuance. 74 The court stated, however, that a
defense continuance does not automatically waive the running of the
time. 75 In Bishop, the defense motion or continuance
included a statement
'76
that "[diefendant waives the six-month rule."
In Lucero, the court of appeals affirmed the metropolitan court's
dismissal of a criminal complaint for failure to prosecute within the sixmonth period mandated by Rule 7-506(B). 77 The state filed charges against
the defendant on October 2, 1986 for driving while under the influence
of alcohol and other offenses . When the arresting officer failed to appear
for trial, the court dismissed the case without prejudice. On December
19, the state refiled charges and trial was set for March 11, 1987. The
defendant obtained two continuances, and trial was once again set for
May 21, 1987. This trial date was postponed, however, because of the
absence of the trial judge. When all parties appeared for trial on July
9, the court dismissed the charges because six months had passed since
the original filing date. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.78
The court of appeals held that the filing of a new complaint does not
79
toll the operation of the rule if it alleges no new facts or charges.

67. Id. at 106, 766 P.2d at 1340.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 108, 766 P.2d at 1342.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 109, 766 P.2d at 1343.
72. Id.
73. Id. See supra note 47.
74. Bishop, 108 N.M. at 109, 766 P.2d at 1343. In his dissent, Judge Apodaca stated that the
majority inappropriately confused waiver with the exception provision of the rule. Id. at 110, 766
P.2d at 1344.
75. Id. at 109, 766 P.2d at 1343. See also Lucero, 108 N.M. at 551, 775 P.2d at 753 ("[a]utomatic
tolling of the six-month rule during a delay caused by defendant's conduct is not required") (citing
Bishop).
76. 108 N.M. at 106, 766 P.2d at 1340.
77. 108 N.M. at 551, 775 P.2d at 753 (discussing Sup. CT. RULES ANN. 7-506(B) (Repl. Pamp.
1988); see supra note 47).
78. Id. at 549, 775 P.2d 751.
79. Id. at 551, 775 P.2d at 753.
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Harmonizing its holding with State v. Chacon8 0 and State v. Benally,8'
the court noted that those cases did not compel a finding that every
82
dismissal by a court initiated the running of a second six-month period.
In Lucero, the court found that the charges in the second complaint
were identical to those in the first, that no new facts or information
formed the basis of the second complaint, and that the primary reason
for refiling was the state's negligence in prosecuting the first complaint.83
Even without the six-month time period recommencing with the second
complaint, the trial setting vacated by defendant's motion for continuance
was within the original six-month period.8 4 While the court had the power
to toll the running of the six-month rule due to Lucero's continuances,
it was within its discretion not to do so. 5 A court's decision to toll must
be based on an analysis of all relevant factors.8 6 Based upon the history
of the case, the court of appeals could not find error as a matter of
87
law and affirmed the lower court's decision.
III. JURY SELECTION
A. Peremptory Challenges
In State v. Goode"' and State v. Jim9 the court of appeals examined
the state's use of peremptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky9 ° provided
the framework for analyzing whether the prosecution violates a defendant's
right to equal protection by using peremptory challenges to exclude
members of the defendant's race from the jury.9 1
The court of appeals in Goode stated the proper procedure for analyzing
whether challeges were discriminatory and articulated circumstances that
raise an inference of purposeful discrimination and criteria by which to

80. 103 N.M. 288, 706 P.2d 152 (1985) (amended supplemental criminal information was sufficiently different from original to commence second six-month period).
81. 99 N.M. 415, 658 P.2d 1142 (Ct. App. 1983) (second six-month period commenced on filing
of amended information).
82. Lucero, 108 N.M. at 551, 775 P.2d at 753.
83. Id. at 550, 775 P.2d at 752.
84. Id. at 551, 775 P.2d at 753.
85. Id. (citing Bishop, 108 N.M. at 106, 766 P.2d at 1340.)
86. Id. Under Sup. CT. RuLEs ANN. 7-506(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1988), "A metropolitan court must
decide whether the defendant was responsible for the failure to hold trial in a timely fashion." Id.
87. Lucero, 108 N.M. at 551, 775 P.2d at 753.
88. 107 N.M. 298, 756 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1988).
89. 107 N.M. 779, 765 P.2d 195 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 720, 764 P.2d 49 (1988).
90. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
91. New Mexico first applied the Batson criteria in State v. Sandoval, 105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d
501 (Ct. App. 1987). To raise the issue, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing that
the state's challenges were exercised in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 698, 736 P.2d at 503. To
establish a prima facie case, the defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant's
race from the venire, and that these facts and other circumstances raise an inference that the
prosecutor exercised his challenges to remove members of the panel on account of their race. Id.
(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96). Once the defendant has made the requisite showing, the burden
shifts to the state to come forward with racially neutral explanations for its challenges. Id. at 700,
736 P.2d at 505.
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examine prosecutors' justifications for challenges. 92 Goode involved unusual facts for an examination of discriminatory peremptory challenges
because neither the trial judge, the prosecutor, nor the defense counsel
realized that the excluded panel member was black until after the jury
had been selected. 93 To establish a prima facie case of racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, a defendant must establish that he
is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the prosecuter has used
peremptory challenges to remove members of that group from the jury
and that the circumstances raise an inference of racial discrimination. 94
In Goode, the court cited three circumstances that would raise an inference
of discriminatory use: a showing that the defendant's race is substantially
underrepresented on the jury; a showing that the case is susceptible to
racial discrimination because the victim and defendant are of different
races; and a showing that the state's challenges have excluded all members
of the defendant's race. 95 In Goode, the court found that the prima facie
burden had been met because the victim and defendant were from different
races and the 96state's challenge excluded the only black panel member
from the jury.
The court determined that only after the prima facie case has been
established should the state's racially neutral justifications be examined. 97
While the state's burden is not as strict as that imposed for removing
a juror for cause, the state must give "clear and reasonably specific
reasons that are related to the case to be tried." 98 The trial court then
must examine the state's reasons to determine whether they are "genuine
and reasonable."99
Several circumstances might indicate that a prosecutor's justifications
are pretextual. The court identified the following circumstances: varying
treatment of white and nonwhite panel members; desultory or inadequate
voir dire of members of a defendant's race; justification unrelated to
the specific case; and a past prosecutorial pattern of challenges against
particular racial groups.'00 In addition, the court noted that assumptions
by prosecutors that members of a specific race hold certain beliefs or
will act in predictable ways are unconstitutional.' 0'
Conversely, if the totality of circumstances indicates that the prosecution
has carefully considered the merits of each panel member, the court will
not find discriminatory use of a challenge. 10 2 In Goode, the court found

92. Goode, 107 N.M. at 301-03, 756 P.2d at 581-83.
93. Id. at 300, 756 P.2d at 580.
94. Id. at 301, 756 P.2d at 581.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (adopting the approach taken in People v. Granillo, 197 Cal. App. 3d 110, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 639 (1987)).
98. Id. at 301, 756 P.2d at 581.
99. Id. at 302, 756 P.2d at 582.
100. Id. at 302-03, 756 P.2d at 582-83.
101. Id. at 303, 756 P.2d at 583.
102. Id.
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that the prosecutor's exclusion of the juror because she had previously
served on a hung jury, combined with the fact that the prosecutor was
ignorant of the panel member's race was sufficient.' 03 The court cautioned
°4
trial courts, however, that Goode presented an unusual fact situation.'
The prosecutor's assertion of ignorance of the race of a panel member
should rarely be given substantial credence. 05
The court again examined discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
in State v. Jim. 't0 In Jim, the court held that the defendant failed to
establish a prima facie case because circumstances did not support an
inference that the prosecutor excluded the panel member because she was
Navajo.' 7 The court indicated that the prima facie case was weak because
both victim and defendant were Navajo, and there was no showing that
Navajos were underrepresented on the jury.1 °8 The defendant argued that
two Navajos were removed from the panel for cause, that the prosecution
did not voir dire the excluded panel member, and that the presence of
two Navajos on the jury did not automatically rule out discrimination.'0 9
The court held that the prosecutor's failure to question the prospective
juror was relevant in evaluating the prosecutor's justifications but insufficient to establish the prima facie case." '0 Because the defendant did
not establish the prima facie case, the court did not examine the prosecutor's justifications for the exclusion."'
B. Removal for Cause
The following cases, State v. Jim,"'2 State v. Sutphin,"3 State v. Espinosa," 4 and State v. Wiberg,"5 demonstrate the appellate courts' strong
support for a trial court's discretion to retain or dismiss jurors for cause.
Absent clear abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not disturb the
jury selection below.
In Jim, the defendant asserted that a juror was improperly excused6
for cause because of the juror's acquaintance with the defense counsel."1
The defendant argued that no showing was made that the juror could

103. Id. at 303-04, 756 P.2d at 583-84.
104. Id. at 304, 756 P.2d at 584.
105. Id.
106. 107 N.M. 779, 765 P.2d 195 (Ct. App. 1988).
107. Id. at 782, 765 P.2d at 198.
108. Id. at 781-82, 765 P.2d at 197-98. This case also indicates the importance of making a
factual showing on the record that the excluded juror is a member of a cognizable race. Here,
prosecution objected that other than her appearance, there was no actual showing that the excluded
panel member was Navajo. Id. at 781, 765 P.2d at 197. The appeals court agreed in this case to
assume she was Navajo; however, practitioners rely on such tolerance at their peril.
109. Id. at 782, 765 P.2d at 198. Defendant cited United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3d
Cir. 1988), for this general proposition.
110. Jim, 107 N.M. at 782, 776 P.2d at 198.
111. Id.
112. 107 N.M. 779, 776 P.2d 195 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 720, 764 P.2d 491 (1988).
113. 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314 (1988).
114. 107 N.M. 293, 756 P.2d 573 (1988).
115. 107 N.M. 152, 754 P.2d 529 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 106, 753 P.2d 352 (1988).
116. 107 N.M. at 782, 765 P.2d at 198.
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not be fair and impartial.11 7 The court stated that the standard of review
was abuse of discretion. Here the trial court did not abuse its discretion;
abuse of discretion occurs only when the court allows a biased juror to
right only to impartial jurors, not to impartial
sit." "Defendant has ' a legal
9
""
choice.
his
of
jurors
In Sutphin, the defendant challenged the removal of two prospective
jurors who were opposed to the death penalty. 20 The state sought the
death penalty against prisoner Sutphin for the murder of his cellmate. 2,'
The defendant was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. 22 The
supreme court upheld the trial court's assessment of the jurors' ability
to view the proceedings impartially and apply the law in accordance with
the court's instruction. 23 The court based its decision on the standard
established in Wainwright v. Witt'2 4 for determining when a prospective
juror may be excluded for his views on capital punishment.
Espinosa and Wiberg illustrate that a defendant who challenges the
court's role in jury selection must meet the heavy burden of proving
abuse of discretion. Espinosa appealed the trial court's refusal to allow
him to voir dire panel members about whether they would be prejudiced
by his decision not to testify. 25 The trial court excluded this question
on the basis that it inquired into an issue of law rather than fact. 126 In
affirming, the court of appeals emphasized that the direction of voir dire27
is discretionary and will only be reversed upon a finding of abuse.

117. Id. at 783, 765 P.2d at 199.
118. Id. (quoting United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 184-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
963 (1954)). The New Mexico Supreme Court's clear directive in Fuson v. State, 105 N.M. 632,
735 P.2d 1138 (1987) may have prompted the court's caution in Jim. In Fuson, the supreme court
granted the defendant a new trial because the trial court refused to remove a juror for cause who
was acquainted with several witnesses. Id. at 633, 735 P.2d at 1139. After the court's refusal, the
defense used a peremptory challenge to remove the offending juror. Because jurors were then chosen
after defense had exhausted its peremptory challenges, the trial court's refusal impaired Fuson's
right to a peremptory challenge. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, relying upon Martinez
v. State, 95 N.M. 445, 623 P.2d 565 (1981), for its holding that the defendant must prove prejudice.
The supreme court, following the lead of federal courts, disagreed and overruled Martinez. The
court held that every defendant has a right to an impartial jury, and "prejudice is presumed when
the right of peremptory challenge is denied or impaired." Fuson, 105 N.M. at 634, 735 P.2d at
1140.
119. Jim, 107 N.M. at 783, 765 P.2d at 199.
120. 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 314 (1988).
121. Id. at 129, 753 P.2d at 1317.
122. Id. The fact that Sutphin did not receive the death penalty does not moot the issue. The
debate concerns whether a defendant is accorded a fair trial from an impartial, representative jury
when only those citizens who unquestioningly accept capital punishment are selected.
123. Id. at 130, 753 P.2d at 1318. One juror stated he had considered the issue but "still couldn't
vote for [the death penalty]." Id. at 129, 753 P.2d at 1317. The second juror stated she could
consider the death penalty only in cases involving the death of a police officer. Id.
124. 469 U.S. 412 (1985). In Wainwright, the Court held that a prospective juror may be dismissed
for cause when his views on capital punishment "would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Id. at 424.
The Court adopted the more relaxed standard established by Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980),
and abandoned the necessity to prove an excluded juror's bias with "unmistakable clarity" as
required by Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
125. Espinosa, 107 N.M. at 296, 756 P.2d at 576.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Noting that the defense counsel agreed without objection to the court's
128
direction, the court of appeals declined to find an abuse of discretion.
Similarly, in Wiberg, the court held that the defendant did not sustain
his burden of proving a potential juror's partiality.129 Wiberg was convicted
of driving under the influence of alcohol, vehicular homicide while driving
under the influence of alcohol, reckless driving, and causing great bodily
harm while driving under the influence of alcohol.' 3 0 On appeal, he
contended he was denied a fair trial because the court failed to strike
a juror with very strong views against drinking.' When asked by defense
counsel whether she could be impartial in judging the case, the juror
indicated that she could.' 3 2 The court of appeals affirmed. Because defense
counsel did not pursue the inquiry after the juror said she could be
impartial, defendant did not meet his burden in demonstrating partiality.'3 3
IV. JUROR MISCONDUCT
In State v. Sacoman, 3 4 the defendant appealed his murder conviction
partially on the basis of juror misconduct. Sacoman claimed, as an alibi
defense, that he was working as a busboy at a hotel at the time of the
murder. Work records indicated that he had not clocked out that day,
and various witnesses offered conflicting testimony about Sacoman's
presence at the work place and about the hotel's clock-out procedures.'3 5
One juror injected his personal experience as a busboy into the jury's
deliberations; another juror injected a fabricated conversation she claimed
to have had with a hotel payroll clerk. 3 6 This communication of specific
knowledge was extraneous information and created a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.3 7 However, because the jury had already unanimously decided that the defendant was at the scene of the murder and
not at work by the time the extraneous information was introduced, the
court of appeals held that "the trial court reasonably found presumption
of prejudice was overcome."'3

128. Id.
129. 107 N.M. at 157, 754 P.2d at 534.
130. Id. at 153, 754 P.2d at 530.
131. Id. at 156, 754 P.2d at 533. The juror was a member of MADD (Mothers Against Drunk
Driving) who stated she "hated" drinking and considered it a sin. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 157, 754 P.2d at 534. The court also noted that it was the defense counsel who
"rehabilitated" the prospective juror. Id.
134. 107 N.M. 588, 762 P.2d 250 (1988).
135. Id. at 589-90, 762 P.2d at 251-52.
136. Id. at 590, 762 P.2d at 252. Jury deliberations must concern only the factual record and
not extraneous facts which have not been "screened through the judicial process." Id. at 591, 762
P.2d at 253 (quoting People v. Huntley, 87 A.D.2d 488, 492, 452 N.Y.S.2d 952, 955 (1982)).
137. Id. at 590-91, 754 P.2d at 252-53.
138. Id. at 592, 762 P.2d at 254. See State v. Zinn, 106 N.M. 544, 550, 746 P.2d 650, 656
(1987) (one method of rebutting prejudice is to show the improper communication occurred when
the jury was already prepared to return a verdict). The court in Sacoman also noted the strength
of the state's case. Not only did two codefendants who pled to lesser charges testify, but two other
witnesses testified that defendant physically reenacted his role in the fatal shooting the following
day. 107 N.M. at 592, 762 P.2d at 254.
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Sacoman further claimed that the woman who fabricated the conver-

sation and who then perjured herself at a hearing on the motion for a
new trial was a biased and dishonest juror.3 9 He claimed mistrial because
she had prejudiced his right to a fair and impartial jury.' 40 The court
of appeals held that whether a juror should be disqualified is a question
of fact and that the trial court's ruling would not be disturbed unless
unreasonable. 14' The court found the trial court's assessment reasonable
because the fellow jurors were unaffected by her statements and because
she was "motivated only by her appraisal
of the evidence heard at trial,
' 42
and her desire for peer recognition."'
V. TRIAL PROCEDURE
In State v. Archuleta,143 the defendant appealed his conviction after a
bench trial for possession of marijuana, a lesser-included charge that the
court considered sua sponte. The sole issue on appeal was whether, by
waiving his right to jury trial, the defendant waived his right to decide
whether to submit a lesser-included charge.'"
The defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the charge of possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute. 4 Neither the defense nor the
prosecution requested a finding on the lesser charge of mere possession.'46
The defendant argued on appeal that State v. Boeglin'47 held that a
defendant has the exclusive right to determine whether lesser offenses
should be submitted to the factfinder and that right was not lost because
he waived his right to a jury trial. 48 Disagreeing, the court stated that
Boeglin merely held that a defendant has a right to an instruction for
a lesser-included offense if the evidence supports it, not that he has the

right to waive such an instruction.

49

The court held that at a bench

139. Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 592, 762 P.2d at 254.
140. Id. at 593, 762 P.2d at 255.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 108 N.M. 397, 772 P.2d 1320 (Ct. App. 1989).
144. Id. at 398, 772 P.2d at 1321.
145. Id.
146. Id. Defendant had stipulated to having 1.4 ounces of marijuana at the time of his arrest.
Id.
147. 105 N.M. 247, 731 P.2d 943 (1987).
148. Archuleta, 108 N.M. at 398, 772 P.2d. at 1321. In Boeglin, the court stated that a defendant
has the duty to make strategic choices regarding submission of lesser-included offenses. 105 N.M.
at 249, 731 P.2d at 945. In Boeglin, the trial court advised the defendant and his counsel that the
defendant was entitled to submission of an instruction for second degree murder. Id. at 248-49,
731 P.2d at 944-45. Against the advice of counsel, Boeglin declined to submit the instruction and
was convicted of first degree murder. Id. at 249, 731 P.2d at 945. On appeal, Boeglin argued that
the trial court had a duty to submit sua sponte an instruction on a lesser offense, which was
supported by the evidence, in order to assure the defendant a fair trial. Id. Disagreeing, the court
of appeals responded that the decision to submit a lesser-included offense instruction is not a
fundamental right that cannot be waived. Id. at 250, 731 P.2d at 946. The court held the defendant
voluntarily waived his right to a lesser-included offense instruction and stated that the court was
not required to give the second degree murder instruction sua sponte, regardless of whatever requests
or objections are made by the prosecution or defense. Id. at 249, 252, 731 P.2d 945, 948.
149. Archuleta, 108 N.M. at 398, 772 P.2d at 1321.
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trial, the court may consider lesser-included charges that neither the
defense nor the prosecution have requested.' 50 The court declined to allow
the defendant to reconsider his waiver of jury trial since a defendant
does not have the exclusive right to determine whether a lesser-included
offense instruction will be submitted to the jury. 5 ' The factfinder may
consider a lesser-included offense in both a bench or jury trial.'5 2 In the
case of a bench trial, the court expressly held that the "lesser-included
charge may be argued by either party, or may be considered sua sponte
by the trial court."'
VI. SENTENCING
Four cases in the survey year, Saavedra v. State,"14 State v. Morton,'
Hayes v. State, 5 6 and Gillespie v. State,'57 established important rules in

sentencing.
In Saavedra, the court held that a presumption of vindictive sentencing
is inapplicable in a case where the sentencer on remand is a different
person than the one who entered the first sentence. !" Saavedra was
originally sentenced to life imprisonment plus twenty-one years, to run
year sentence was entered to
concurrently. On remand, the twenty-one
6°
59
run consecutively with the life sentence. In North Carolina v. Pearce,
the United States Supreme Court held that due process requires that a
defendant who has appealed must not be penalized by receiving a stricter
sentence after the second trial. Such a practice would discourage defendants from exercising their constitutional rights.' 6' The Court held that
when the second sentence is more severe, a presumption of vindictiveness
arises. 162 The state must then rebut the presumption by a showing63 that
evidence uncovered only at the second trial justified the increase.

150. Id. (citing, inter alia, State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983) (trial court not precluded
from considering lesser-included offense in bench trial where the defendant employs an "all or
nothing" theory.))
151. Id. at 399-400, 772 P.2d at 1322-23 (citing State v. Edwards, 97 N.M. 141, 637 P.2d 572
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 621, 642 P.2d at 621 (1981)). In Edwards, the defendant was
charged with second degree murder with the use of a firearm. 97 N.M. at 142, 637 P.2d at 573.
The state sought a conviction of involuntary manslaughter by a negligent act, and the jury received
an instruction on this lesser-included offense over the objection of defendant. Id. at 145, 637 P.2d
at 576.
152. Archuleta, 108 N.M. at 400, 772 P.2d at 1323.
153. Id. at 399, 772 P.2d at 1322.
154. 108 N.M. 38, 766 P.2d 298 (1988). For a discussion of the double jeopardy issue involved
in this case, see infra notes 277-88 and accompanying text.
155. 107 N.M. 478, 760 P.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1988). Morton is discussed supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
156. 106 N.M. 806, 751 P.2d 186 (1988).
157. 107 N.M. 455, 760 P.2d 147 (1988).
158. 108 N.M. at 44, 766 P.2d at 304.
159. Id. at 44, 766 P.2d at 303-04.
160. 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
161. Id. at 724-25.
162. Id. at 726.
163. Saavedra, 108 N.M. at 44, 766 P.2d at 304 (citing Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134,
141-44 (1986)).
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In Saavedra, the court expressly overruled State v. Sisneros'64 by holding
that "the fact that the sentencers are different, as they are in this case,
is sufficient grounds to make the presumption of vindictiveness inapplicable.' ' 6 In Sisneros, the court held that the while the presence of
different sentencers is relevant, it is not dispositive. 166 The court of appeals
held that Saavedra was controlled by the Supreme Court's ruling in Texas
v. MuCullough.167 In McCullough, the court held that where two different
sentencers were involved, no "increase" took place, but rather, two courts
simply held differently, thus the presumption of vindictiveness was re168
lieved.
In Hayes, the supreme court decided an important jurisdictional issue,
subsequently incorporated into the court's rule on sentence modification. 69
Hayes was convicted of second degree murder, and his conviction was
affirmed by the court of appeals in December 1986.170 As required by
the rule, Hayes petitioned for modification of sentence within thirty days
of affirmance.' 7' After the defense attorney and the trial court exchanged
communications, the motion was not heard until May 1987.172 The trial
court dismissed the motion on the basis that since more than 30 days
had elapsed since affirmance of the conviction, the court was without
jurisdiction to hear the motion. 73 Hayes argued that many federal circuits
adhere to the "reasonable time rule," which allows courts discretion to
modify sentences after thirty days. 174 Hayes also argued that even if the
trial court properly dismissed the motion, he was denied due process
because he had relied upon the court's original assurances that the motion
17
would be heard.
The supreme court determined that Rule 5-801 mandates that the filing
of a motion to modify sentence is jurisdictional, so motions must be
filed within thirty days. 76 The disposition of the motion, however, is
discretionary and trial courts may hear motions after thirty days. 177 With

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

101 N.M. 679, 687 P.2d 736 (1984).
Saavedra, 108 N.M. at 44, 766 P.2d at 304.
101 N.M. at 682, 687 P.2d at 739.
475 U.S. 134 (1986).
Saavedra, 108 N.M. at 44, 766 P.2d at 304 (quoting McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140).
See Sup. CT. RuLEs ANN. 5-801 (Cum. Supp. 1989) (committee commentary) which states:
The rule, as originally drafted, limited the period of time that district court [sic]
could modify a sentence to a period of thirty (30) days after imposition of sentence.
Rule 5-801 was revised in 1988 to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in
Hayes v. State ...
Under this rule, no modification of sentence can be considered by the trial court
after the filing of notice of appeal. However, the trial court may modify the sentence
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the mandate.
170. Hayes, 106 N.M. at 807, 751 P.2d at 187.
171. Id. at 807, 751 P.2d at 187.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The court cited Gaertner v. United States, 763 F.2d 787, 790-91 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1009 (1985), for a partial list
of circuits that recognize the reasonable time rule.
175. Hayes, 106 N.M. at 807, 751 P.2d at 187.
176. Id. at 808, 751 P.2d at 188.
177. Id.
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this ruling, the supreme court specifically overruled the relevant portions
of State v. Sykes.178 The court also decided in Hayes that if the trial
court fails to rule within ninety days, the motion is denied as a matter
of law. 17 9 The court also agreed that dismiss'al here would have been a
clear due process violation, since Hayes had relied upon the assurances
of the trial court that the motion would be heard. 8 0
In Gillespie, the supreme court, relying on the statute that governs
parole procedure and upon Brock v. Sullivan, s' held that a parole period
for felony conviction commences immediately after the sentence has been

completed, and that it may run concurrently with a misdemeanor sen-

tence. m2 The court in Gillespie overruled State v. Smith"3 to the extent
84

that it was inconsistent with its holding.'

VII. POST-TRIAL
A. Pardons

In an unusual case, State v. Mondragon,

5

the court of appeals ex-

amined the limits of the governor's power to pardon. 186 Mondragon was

178. 98 N.M. 458, 649 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1982). In Sykes, the court of appeals held that, except
to correct an illegal sentence, all rulings must be made within 30 days. Id. at 460, 649 P.2d at
763.
179. 106 N.M. at 808, 751 P.2d at 188. Sup. CT. Ruins ANN. 5-801(B) (Cum. Supp. 1989)
provides in pertinent part:
Modification of sentence. A motion to reduce a sentence may be filed within thirty
(30) days after the sentence is imposed, or within thirty (30) days after receipt by
the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of
the appeal, or within thirty (30) days after entry of any order or judgment of the
appellate court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment
of conviction. . . . The court shall determine the motion within ninety (90) days
after the date it is filed or the motion is deemed to be denied.
The rule was also amended by adding present paragraph (A), which provides: "Correction of sentence
- The court may correct any illegal sentence at any time pursuant to Rule 5-802 and may correct
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided by this rule for the reduction of
sentence."
180. Hayes, 106 N.M. at 808, 751 P.2d at 188.
181. 105 N.M. 412, 733 P.2d 860 (1987).
182. 107 N.M. 456, 760 P.2d 148 (1988). In Brock, the court stated:
In the absence of some fault on the part of the prisoner, a sentence cannot be
divided into fragments so as to compel the prisoner to serve the sentence in
installments. Because the legislature has deemed the parole period to be part of
the sentence of a convicted person, a separation of each parole period from its
connected period of imprisonment necessarily requires that the sentence be fragmented
and served in installments. We are not persuaded that the legislature intended such
a result when it enacted the Criminal Sentencing Act ...
105 N.M. at 414, 733 P.2d at 862 (citations omitted). N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10(C) (1987) reads
in part: "An inmate who was convicted of a fourth degree felony and who has served the sentence
of imprisonment imposed by the court . . . shall be required to undergo a one-year period of
parole."
183. 102 N.M. 350, 695 P.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1985).
184. 107 N.M. at 456, 760 P.2d at 148. In Smith, the court of appeals held that "[wihen any
convict has been committed under several convictions with separate sentences, the sentences shall
be construed as one continuous sentence for the full length of the combined sentences." 102 N.M.
at 352, 695 P.2d at 836.
185. 107 N.M. 421, 759 P.2d 1003 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 107 N.M. 267, 755 P.2d 605 (1988).
186. The New Mexico Constitution grants pardoning power to the governor. N.M. CONST. art.
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convicted of fourteen offenses and appealed the enhanced sentence imposed during habitual offender proceedings on twelve counts that had
been pardoned by the governor. 8 7 The court
of appeals agreed with
88
Mondragon and reversed the enhancement.
In its memorandum in opposition to summary reversal, the state contended that the governor had no power to pardon habitual sentences,
the governor had no power to pardon habitual offender status, and the
pardon was premature.8 9 The court of appeals rejected the state's arguments, holding that the habitual offender statutes do not limit the
governor's power to pardon.' 9° If the legislature desires to limit pardoning
power, it must do so expressly.' 9' The court stated that habitual offender

statutes are highly punitive and must be construed strictly; the court
would not interpret them as presenting implied limits on the governor's
pardoning power. 192 The court noted that the intent93 of the habitual

offender statutes was not frustrated in this instance.'

In its second argument, the state claimed that the governor only has

power to pardon Mondragon's offenses, not his status as a habitual
offender. 94 The court agreed and noted that its holding did not demand
a retreat from the supreme court's ruling in Shankle v. Woodruff.19 If
Mondragon commits any further offenses, the pardoned offenses can be
used to enhance sentence. The governor is not precluded, however, from
pardoning any sentence, even that imposed as a result of habitual offender

status. '
Finally, the state argued that the pardon was premature because Mondragon had not yet been determined a habitual offender.'9 The court

V § 6. Mondragon was convicted and sentenced for 14 offenses. Mondragon, 107 N.M. at 422,
759 P.2d at 1004. The state filed for habitual offender enhancement, seeking an additional year
for each offense. During pendency of a prior appeal, the governor pardoned 12 of the sentences
and specifically pardoned the enhancements. Id. Notwithstanding the governor's pardon, the trial
court sentenced Mondragon for an additional 14 years as a habitual offender.
187. Mondragon, 107 N.M. at 422, 759 P.2d at 1004.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 423, 759 P.2d at 1005. Habitual offender enhancements may run concurrently or
consecutively. Thus, Mondragon's enhancement could have been one or fourteen years. Because
sentence enhancements were not pardoned on two of the counts, the enhancement of at least one
year was not disturbed.
194. Id.
195. 64 N.M. 88, 92-93, 324 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1958). Shankle was sentenced to life imprisonment
for swindling in 1941. In 1949, he was granted full pardon by the governor. In 1952, he was again
convicted on similar charges. Addressing the question for the first time, the supreme court held
that pardon did not erase the underlying conviction, thus the pardoned offense could be used to
enhance the sentence for a subsequent crime.
196. Mondragon, 107 N.M. at 423, 759 P.2d at 1005, The court noted that if the governor had
not specifically pardoned Mondragon's habitual offender sentences, the state's question might be
reached. Given the governor's unequivocal statement and his clear authority, however, no sentence
for habitual offender could be enforced. Id. at 424, 759 P.2d at 1006.
197. Id. The state noted that the provision in the New Mexico Constitution that pardon is only
allowed "after conviction" was a deliberate attempt to limit pardoning abuses that existed at common
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disagreed, finding that Mondragon had been convicted of the underlying
offenses. The determination of habitual offender status represented a
finding and sentencing thereon, not a finding of guilt. 98
B. Meritorious Deductions
Martinez v. State199 laid to rest the possibility that those persons
sentenced to life imprisonment might serve less than the mandatory thirty
years by receiving meritorious deductions. By statute, an inmate sentenced
to life imprisonment for a capital offense first becomes eligible for parole
in thirty years.2 0 Martinez contended that this statute denies capital felons
equal protection by precluding the receipt of meritorious deductions as
mandated by section 33-2-34.201 The supreme court stated that even if
the law were discriminatory, it would not be unconstitutional if rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 2 2 The court then held that
confining dangerous persons is a legitimate and 20 3rational basis for imprisoning capital felons for at least thirty years.
VIII. CHILDRENS' CODE
During the survey year, New Mexico courts demonstrated their reluctance to expand upon legislative intent in construing juvenile law. The
following two cases applied very strict statutory construction.
In State v. Michael R.,204 the court of appeals clarified section 32-1-

31(E) of the Childrens' Code. Under a former version of the law, before
placing a child on probation, the court had to find both that the child

had committed a delinquent act and that the child was in need of care
and rehabilitation.20 5 Under the current law, the court need only find

law or in the federal system. The court suggested the following authorities for this historical
proposition: In Re Anderson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 48, 92 P.2d 1020 (1939); Boudin, The Presidential
Pardons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M. Nixon: Have the Limitations on the Pardon Power
Been Exceeded?, 48 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1 (1976); Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A
Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475 (1977).
198. Mondragon, 107 N.M. at 424, 759 P.2d at 1006.
199. 108 N.M. 382, 772 P.2d 1305 (1989).
200. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10 (A)(Repl. Pamp. 1987).
201. Martinez, 108 N.M. at 383, 772 P.2d at 1306. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-2-34 (1987) provides
in part:
Any inmate confined in the penitentiary of New Mexico or other institution designated
by the corrections department for the confinement of adult criminal offenders may
be awarded a deduction of not more than ten days' meritorious good time per
month based upon good conduct upon recommendation of the classification committee and approval of the warden ....
202. Martinez, 108 N.M. at 383, 772 P.2d at 1306 (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263
(1973)).
203. Id. The court cited its own opinion in State v. Clark, 108 N.M. 288, 313, 772 P.2d 322,
349 (1989) for a full discussion of a felon's dangerousness in relation to the actual time he serves
in prison.
204. 107 N.M. 794, 765 P.2d 767 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 109 N.M. 748, 764 P.2d 879 (1988).
205. Id. at 795, 765 P.2d at 768.
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that the child committed a delinquent act. 2°6 If the court does not find
that the child is in need of care and rehabilitation, the court may still
place the child on probation without a finding of need for care and
rehabilitation. 20 7 The court may not, however, take the child into custody. 201
In State v. Taylor,2°9 the supreme court construed Childrens' Court
Rule 10-223 and section 32-1-30(B) of the Childrens' Code. Rule 10-223
states that a transfer hearing shall be commenced within thirty days from
filing of a motion to transfer if the child is in custody. 210 The court
held that the hearing need only be commenced within the express time
21
period, not completed.
Section 32-1-30(B) provides that a district judge may impose conditions
on the confinement of a child defendant. 2 2 Taylor argued that this statute
affords the trial court discretion not to sentence a child convicted of a
first degree capital felony to life imprisonment. 2 3 The court held, however,
that this provision may allow the judge to alter the terms of confinement,
but not the length of confinement. Where,21 4as in Taylor's case, a sentence
is mandatory, a judge has no discretion.
IX. FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
During the survey year, the court of appeals relaxed the standard for
the particularity requirement for search warrants, 2 5 reexamined the stan-

206. Id. at 796, 765 P.2d at 769. Michael R. was decided under a statute effective until July,
1989. The current law, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-31(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1989) is the same; in relevant
part, it states:
If the court finds on the basis of a valid admission of the allegations of the petition
or on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt based upon competent material
and relevant evidence that the child committed the acts by reason of which he is
alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision, it may, in the absence of
objection, proceed immediately to hear evidence on whether the child is in need
of care or rehabilitation and file its finding. . . . If the court finds that a child
alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision is not in need of care or
rehabilitation, it may dismiss the petition and order the child released from any
detention or legal custody imposed in the proceedings. No child shall be placed in
the custody of the youth authority after adjudication of his case without a finding
of need for care and rehabilitation.
207. Michael R., 107 N.M. at 796, 765 P.2d at 769.
208. Id.
209. 107 N.M. 66, 752 P.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1988) (construing Sup. CT. Rut~s ANN. 10-223
(Recomp. 1986) and N.M.STAT. ANN. § 32-1-30 (Rep]. Pamp. 1986)).
210. SuP. CT. RuLEs ANN. 10-223 (Recomp. 1986).
211. Taylor, 107 N.M. at 69, 752 P.2d at 784.

212. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 32-1-30(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).

213. Taylor, 107 N.M. at 70, 752 P.2d at 785.
214. Id. at 71, 752 P.2d at 786.
215. See State v. Elam, 108 N.M. 268, 771 P.2d 597 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 273,
771 P.2d 981 (1989); State v. Jones, 107 N.M. 503, 760 P.2d 796 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 561 (1988). An original draft of the sections on the fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments
was prepared by Victoria L. Jones.
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2 16 and modified the plain view
dards for voluntary consent to search,
21

exception to the warrant requirement.

1

A. The ParticularityRequirement

In State v. Jones,21 the court of appeals reversed the district court's
finding that a search warrant listing "invoices, inventory cards, check-

books, bank records to include cancelled checks, and any other records
that show items bought or sold in the operation of Chaveroo Supply
219

Co." was a general search warrant in violation of the fourth amendment.

Jones was alleged to have received stolen goods in his oil field supply
business. 220 The prosecution offered evidence, uncovered by the search,
that Jones paid the seller of the stolen goods only eleven percent of their

retail value. 22'

Relying on Andresen v. Maryland,222 the court held that the restrictions
of the fourth amendment's particularity requirement may be relaxed when
an alleged criminal scheme is complex and involves a mass of documents
used as a "shield" to cover incriminating evidence. 223 Where probable
cause has been established, the description of the documents to be seized
need only be "as specific as the circumstances and the nature of activity
under investigation permit."224
The court further held that it would have been unreasonable to limit
the warrant to documents from specific periods because of the circumstances and the complexity of the criminal scheme. 225 The court's substantial relaxation of the particularity requirement follows from the court's
emphasis on the need to provide a "practical margin of flexibility"
in
226
cases of complex and carefully concealed criminal schemes.
In State v. Elam,22' 7 the court relied on its decision in Jones to reject
defendant's fourth amendment claim of an unconstitutional general

216. See State v. Hadley, 108 N.M. 255, 771 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Anderson, 107
N.M. 165, 754 P.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1988).
217. See State v. Miles, 108 N.M. 556, 775 P.2d 758 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 433,
773 P.2d 1240 (1989).
218. 107 N.M. 503, 760 P.2d 796 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 561 (1988).
219. Id. at 504, 760 P.2d at 797. The warrant clause of the fourth amendment provides that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
IV. See generally Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (through the fourteenth amendment, the
fourth amendment prohibits states from using general warrants).
220. Jones, 107 N.M. at 504, 760 P.2d at 797.
221. Id.
222. 427 U.S. 463, 481 n.10 (1976).
223. Jones, 107 N.M. at 505, 760 P.2d at 798 (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
481 n.10 (1976)).
224. Id. (quoting United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 814 (1983)). In Jones, probable cause to search was based on a Chaveroo employee's
description of Jone's scheme for concealing evidence of illegal purchases, on the employee's statement
that Jones purchased stolen equipment on numerous occasions and on a "roustabout's" statement
that he had sold stolen goods to Jones at a reduced price. Id. at 505, 760 P.2d at 798.
225. Id. The affiant's informant had been unable to estimate the number of purchases of stolen
goods that had occurred over a seven-year period. Id.
226. Id. (quoting Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1349).
227. 108 N.M. 268, 771 P.2d 597 (Ct. App. 1989).
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search. 22 Elam was convicted of running a fraudulent business from his
home. 229 The police removed three truckloads of documents, pursuant to
a warrant, to establish Elam's fraudulent activities. 2 0 Elam claimed the
search warrant was "general" and sought both to quash the warrant and
to suppress the evidence seized. 2 1 Elam attempted to distinguish Jones,

arguing that it did not apply to searches of a home.2 3 2 The court disagreed,
citing federal cases holding that a home has no greater sanctity when
used as a place of business than any other place of business. 233 The

police had probable cause to believe that virtually all of the records of
of fraudulent activity. 23 4

the business were evidence or instrumentalities

Therefore, the warrant was specific enough to satisfy the particularity

requirement .235
B. Consent
In State v. Anderson, 23 6 the trial court suppressed evidence discovered
when an officer stopped the defendant for speeding, searched the trunk
of his car, and found methamphetamine in plastic bags inside a "laundry"
bag. 23 7 The court of appeals affirmed. 238 The state argued that the officer

had probable cause to search because Anderson fit a drug courier profile
taught in law enforcement classes: he was nervous, was travelling in an
easterly direction, had a carry-bag in his car and no other visible luggage,
slept in a rest area the previous night, and had a bucket of Kentucky
Fried Chicken on the car seat next to him. 23 9 The court held that those
facts described hundreds of innocent motorists travelling New Mexico
highways every day
and were therefore not sufficient to establish probable
24
cause to search. 0

228. Id. at 269, 771 P.2d at 598. In Elam, the court of appeals quoted supreme court's quotation
in Jones from Andresen v. Maryland describing the need for flexible application of the particularity
requirement: .'the complexity of an illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid detection
when the State has demonstrated probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and
probable cause to believe that evidence of this crime is in the suspect's possession."' Id. (quoting
Jones, 107 N.M. at 505, 760 P.2d at 798 (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 481 n.10).
229. Id. Elam invited victims to invest in contrived expeditions for historical artifacts and treasures
through his business, New Mexico Museum Supply and Exploration Co. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. The warrant was 35 pages long, with a three-page appendix, and its language was similar
to that used in Jones: all "records, papers, documents or other tangible evidence, including but
not limited to tax forms, records of income and expenses . . . cancelled checks, invoices, diaries,
journals" etc. of the business were to be seized. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 269-70, 771 P.2d at 598-99 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); United
States v. Cerri, 753 F.2d 61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985)).
234. The affidavit described a wide variety of fraudulent activities Elam carried out in his home.
Id. at 270, 771 P.2d at 599.
235. Id. at 270, 771 P.2d at 599.
236. 107 N.M. 165, 754 P.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1988).
237. Id. at 166-67, 754 P.2d at 543-44.
238. Id. at 166, 754 P.2d at 543.
239. Id. at 169, 754 P.2d at 546.
240. Id.
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The state also argued that the defendant had voluntarily consented to
the search.24 The court held, however, that the trial court's decision to
242
suppress the results of the search was supported by substantial evidence.
The officer pulled Anderson over for driving two miles per hour over
the speed limit.243 After Anderson had given the officer all the information
necessary to issue the speeding ticket, the officer asked Anderson if he
could look in Anderson's trunk. 2" After Anderson assented and opened
the trunk, the officer handled and opened an opaque white cloth bag
he found in the trunk, discovering a substance the officer guessed to be
cocaine.245 The officer then arrested Anderson.2"
After reviewing these facts, the court of appeals concluded that the
trial court's decision to suppress the evidence necessarily included a finding
that the officer unreasonably detained the defendant longer than necessary
to issue the speeding ticket and that the resulting atmosphere was coercive.24 7 Therefore, the totality of the circumstances supported a finding
that Anderson's consent was not voluntary.24 Moreover, the court held
that substantial evidence also supported the trial court's finding that the
defendant's consent was to search the trunk only and did not extend to
the further search of items inside the trunk.24 9
The court of appeals also addressed the issue of voluntary consent in
State v. Hadley.2 0 Officers had gone to the Sagebrush Inn in Taos to
investigate a Crimestoppers tip that Hadley was selling drugs and was
possibly armed.2 1' An officer who knew Hadley approached him, told
him that he had received a tip that Hadley might be armed, and obtained
Hadley's consent to a pat-down search. 2 2 The officer, having noticed
bulges in Hadley's pockets, searched them and found a camera, a flash253
light, and two baggies containing cocaine.
The issue before the court was whether the trial court's finding that
consent was voluntary was supported by sufficient evidence. 2 4 Hadley
argued that his consent to the search was not voluntary because the

241. Id. at 168, 754 P.2d at 545.
242. Id. Whether consent to a search is voluntary is a question of fact. Id. at 167, 754 P.2d at
544 (citing State v. Valencia Olaya, 105 N.M. 690, 736 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1987)). The court
analyzed the facts to see whether in the light of the presumption disfavoring waiver of constitutional
rights, and considering the totality of the circumstances, consent was "specific and unequivocal"
and given in the absence of duress. Id. (citations omitted).
243. Id. at 166, 754 P.2d at 543.
244. Id. at 167, 754 P.2d at 544.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 168, 754 P.2d at 189.
248. Id. It was not any less coercive because of defendant's size or gender. Id.
249. Id.
250. 108 N.M. 255, 771 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1989).
251. Id. at 256, 771 P.2d at 189.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 257, 771 P.2d at 190. The court framed the issue as "not whether the consent was
voluntary; [but] rather . . . whether the trial court could properly find consent to be voluntary."
Id.
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by supplying incomplete information about
officer induced him to consent
255
the tip he was acting on.
The court rejected Hadley's claim because there was neither affirmative
misrepresentation nor silence that could be equated with fraud by the
officer 256 and because the trial court could have reasonably concluded
that Hadley did not rely on the officer's failure to disclose when he
consented .257
Hadley did not argue that the search of his pockets exceeded the scope
of his consent to a pat-down search. 258 Nevertheless, in noteworthy dictum
the court said that, under the circumstances, the search did not exceed
the scope of consent. 259 The court reasoned that under the circumstances
the officer's observation of bulges in Hadley's pockets supported a "particularized belief" that Hadley might have a weapon. 260 Thus, even if
the officer lacked "objective articulable facts" on which to base his
original stop and detention of Hadley, Hadley's subsequent consent to
a pat-down conferred on the officer the right to make an additional
intrusion into Hadley's pockets.2 6l The court's analysis effectively grafts
the principles of Terry v. Ohio 262 onto a search which, in the absence
of consent, would have been illegal.26
C. Plain View Exception
In State v. Miles,2 " a case of first impression in New Mexico, the
court of appeals held that an officer may investigate the contents of a
legally seized container which is itself contraband when the officer is

"virtually certain" the container contains more contraband. After the
officer stopped Miles for speeding, he noticed a wooden box in plain

255. Id. Hadley also argued that his consent was invalid because he was under the influence of
a combination of alcohol and prescription drugs when he gave it. The court held that the trial
court could reasonably find that the combination of medication and alcohol at the time of the
consent did not render defendant's consent involuntary.
256. Id. at 258, 771 P.2d at 191 (citing United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977)).
257. Id. at 258, 771 P.2d at 191 (citing United States v. Turpin, 707 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1983)).
258. Id. at 256, 771 P.2d at 190.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 257, 771 P.2d at 190 (citing State v. Cobbs, 103 N.M. 623, 711 P.2d 900 (Ct. App.
1985)). In Cobbs, the court of appeals held that police may "conduct a protective search" or
"frisk" a person stopped when the officer reasonably suspects the person has committed a violent
or inherently dangerous crime, such as dealing in large quantities of narcotics, or a person stopped
on suspicion of a non-violent offense where there are other articulable facts that the officer is in
danger. 103 N.M. at 630, 711 P.2d at 907.
262. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry allows an officer to make an investigative stop when the officer
possesses specific and articulable facts which, taken together with "reasonable inferences which [the
officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience," reasonably warrant the
intrusion. Id. at 27. The Supreme Court also relaxed the warrant requirement in Terry to allow
officers to conduct searches reasonably designed to discover weapons in order to protect thenselves
from potential danger when they are face-to-face with suspects. Id. at 29-30.
263. The trial court had found that the officer's initial stop and detention were improper because
they were not based on "objective, articulable facts." Hadley, 108 N.M. at 256-57, 771 P.2d at
189-90. Hadley's voluntary consent, however, vitiated the constitutional problems which arose from
the illegal stop. See id. at 258, 771 P.2d at 191.
264. 108 N.M. 556, 775 P.2d 758 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 433, 773 P.2d 1240 (1989).
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view on the passenger side of the floor of the vehicle. 265 The officer
2
recognized the box as drug paraphenalia by its size and special markings. 66
After asking Miles and the other occupants of the vehicle whether any
of them owned the box, and getting no
response, the officer opened the
267

box and discovered marijuana inside.

Miles argued that the incriminating nature of the box siezed was not
immediately apparent. 268 The court disagreed, stating that the box was
obviously drug paraphernalia because of its size and markings. 269 Because
270
it was in plain view, the officer could seize it without a warrant.
Further, given the nature of the box, the court found that defendant
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the box that would
271
invoke fourth amendment protection of the search of the box's contents.
A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a container
whose contents may be inferred from its outward appearance through
transparency, distinctive configuration, or other factors. 272 However, the

officer must be "virtually certain" that the container contains contraband .273
X. FIFTH AMENDMENT - DOUBLE JEOPARDY
During the survey period, the courts examined double jeopardy in the
contexts of susequent prosecutions for the same offense 74 and multiple
275
punishments for the same offense: merger and sentence enhancement .276
A. Subsequent Prosecutionsfor the Same Offense
In State v. Saavedra,277 the court of appeals considered whether the
double jeopardy clause precludes the state from retrying a defendant
after a trial court declares a mistrial for "manifest necessity" over the

265. Id. at 557, 775 P.2d at 758.
266. Id. The box bore a dot on its side indicating the place to press so that a small pipe would
pop out like a jack-in-the-box. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 558, 775 P.2d at 760. Incriminating evidence may be seized under the plain view
exception if the officer is legally in the position to view the evidence, if the officer discovers the
evidence inadvertently, and if the incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately apparent. Id.
(citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d
183 (1980)). A witness testified that boxes such as the one seized are non-incriminating "novelty
items." Id. at 557, 775 P.2d at 759.
269. Id. at 558, 775 P.2d at 760.
270. Id. The officer was legally entitled to be in the position from which he saw the box. The
defendant did not challenge the length of detention or probable cause to stop. Id.
271. Id. at 558-59, 775 P.2d at 760-61.
272. Id. at 559, 775 P.2d at 761 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979)).
273. Miles, 108 N.M. at 559, 775 P.2d at 761 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 751
(1983)(Stevens, J., concurring)). The virtual certainty standard is higher than probable cause. See
id.
274. State v. Saavedra, 108 N.M. 38, 766 P.2d 298 (1988); State v. Hamilton, 107 N.M. 186,
754 P.2d 857 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 132, 753 P.2d 1320 (1988).
275. State v. Gammil, 108 N.M. 208, 769 P.2d 1299 (Ct. App. 1989).
276. 107 N.M. 293, 756 P.2d 573 (1988).
277. 108 N.M. 38, 766 P.2d 298 (1988). For a discussion of the vindictive sentencing issue in
this case, see supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
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defendant's objection. Jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn in for
the defendant's first trial. 2 8 If the court grants a mistrial over the
defendant's objection, the state may only retry the defendant if the
mistrial was for reasons of "manifest necessity.' '279
At Saavedra's first trial on remand, Saavedra's attorney had come
down with chicken pox, and substitute counsel was representing Saavedra.2 80 The prosecutor was scheduled for necessary back surgery on a
specific date, leaving a period of only three days for the trial.28 ' The
court was skeptical whether three days would be adequate; 28 2 moreover,
the judge had promised both himself and his staff
a vacation to begin
23
the day defendant estimated trial could resume.
The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in granting the mistrial. 28 The trial court had considered the alternatives

and had valid reasons to declare the mistrial.285 Relying on cases from
other jurisdictions, 2 6 the court of appeals also stated that "the extended

illness of one of the participants in a criminal proceeding justifies the
declaration of a mistrial for reasons of manifest necessity.
28
court of appeals affirmed Saavedra's convictions.

' 28 7

Thus, the

278. Id. (citing Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963)).
279. Id. (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); State v. Castrillo,
90 N.M. 608, 566 P.2d 1146 (1977)). When a defendant has been acquitted, the double jeopardy
bar against retrial is absolute. When a trial has been aborted before its conclusion, however, a
defendant's right to be protected from double jeopardy must be weighed against the public interest
in prosecution. Because the subordination of the defendant's constitutional right must not be "lightly
undertaken," the prosecuter must "shoulder a heavy burden to justify the mistrial if the double
jeopardy bar is to be avoided." Id. (citation omitted).
280. Id. at 40, 766 P.2d at 300.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 43, 766 P.2d at 303. "The judge noted, based on his experience, that when an attorney
assures him that a matter will take three days to try, he finds it prudent to set aside six." Id.
283. Id. at 40, 766 P.2d at 300. The court of appeals stated, however, that vacation plans will
never constitute manifest necessity and did not consider this reason. Id. at 42 n.2, 766 P.2d at 302
n.2.
284. Id. at 43, 766 P.2d at 303. The court noted that "although it may have been the better
course" not to declare a mistrial, sufficient reason had been given by the trial court. Id.
The court's standard of review of a double jeopardy claim after mistrial will vary between strict
scrutiny and abuse of discretion depending upon the reasons presented for mistrial. Id. at 42, 766
P.2d at 302 (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 507-11 (1978)). Where the trial court
bases its decision on scheduling problems, as it did in Saavedra, the court of appeals will not
overrule unless there is "some clear indication that [the trial court] failed to engage in a 'scrupulous
exercise of judicial discretion'." Id. at 43, 766 P.2d at 303 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470, 485 (1971)).
285. Id. at 43, 766 P.2d at 303. "The trial court was faced with an extremely complex rescheduling
problem involving numerous witnesses, several from outside the state, and a prosecutor and defense
attorney whose health problems might well have thwarted any solution short of a mistrial, or might
have resulted in inadequate representation of either the State or the defendant." Id.
286. Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968); People
v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983); Glover v. United States, 301 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C. 1973);
State v. Cole, 286 Or. 411, 595 P.2d 466, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 346 Pa. Super. 11, 498 A.2d 1345 (1985), app. denied, 514 Pa. 635, 522 A.2d 1105 (1987);
State v. Mendoza, 101 Wis. 2d 659, 305 N.W.2d 166 (Ct. App. 1981).
287. Saavedra, 108 N.M. at 43, 766 P.2d at 303.
288. Id.
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In State v. Hamilton,2 9 the court of appeals reiterated that jeopardy
cannot attach when a court does not have jurisdiction. The court held
that an acquittal by a court without jurisdiction to try the defendant
was void. 290 Therefore, jeopardy did not attach and defendant could not
291
claim double jeopardy at his retrial for the same offense.
In his first trial in magistrate court, the defendant had been convicted
of one count of battery on a peace officer and acquitted of one count
of aggravated assault on a peace officer. 292 On appeal, however, the court
reversed Hamilton's conviction because he had been denied his right to
counsel at the preliminary hearing. 293 On remand, the state recharged the
defendant with the same charges as in the first trial. 294 At the close of
the second trial, Hamilton requested a jury instruction on the offense
of resisting, evading or obstructing a police officer, a lesser-included
offense of aggravated assault on a police officer. 295 The defendant was
convicted on two counts of the reduced offense. 219 Rejecting Hamilton's
objection that retrial on the acquitted count was double jeopardy, the
court of appeals held that denial of counsel deprived the magistrate court
of jurisdiction to either acquit or convict. 297 The acquittal was therefore
29
invalid, and the state could retry the defendant on all charges. 1
B. Merger and Sentence Enhancement
In State v. Gammil,299 the court of appeals vacated the defendant's
sentence for aggravated assault, holding that the offense merged with
the defendant's robbery conviction. Gammil was convicted in the trial
court of robbery, aggravated battery, and conspiracy to commit robbery.3a°
All the charges arose out of an attempted purse-snatching: the defendant
grabbed the victim's purse and threw her to the ground in his attempt
301
to wrest it from her.
In State v. Sandoval,0 2 the court of appeals established two tests to
determine whether multiple punishments for the same charge subject a

289. 107 N.M. 186, 754 P.2d 857 (Ct. App), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 132, 753 P.2d 1320 (1988).
290. Id. at 188, 744 P.2d at 859.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 187, 754 P.2d at 858.
293. Id. (citing State v. Hamilton, 104 N.M. 614, 725 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1986)).
294. Hamilton, 107 N.M. at 187, 754 P.2d at 858.
295. Id.
296. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). Hamilton also argued on appeal
that his conviction for resisting an officer was improper because it is not a lesser-included offense
of either aggravated assault or battery on a peace officer. Hamilton, 107 N.M. at 188, 754 P.2d
at 859. The court agreed but held that a conviction will not be reversed for an improper instruction
when the defendant himself requested the instruction. Id. at 189, 754 P.2d at 860 (citing State v.
Boeglin, 105 N.M. 247, 731 P.2d 943 (1987); State v. Padilla, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471 (Ct.
App. 1986)). For a discussion of Boeglin, see supra note 148.
297. Hamilton, 107 N.M. at 187-88, 754 P.2d at 858-59.
298. Id. at 188, 754 P.2d at 859.
299. 108 N.M. at 208, 210, 769 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Ct. App. 1989).
300. Id.at 208-09, 769 P.2d at 1299-1300.
301. Id. at 210, 769 P.2d at 1301.
302. 90 N.M. 260, 561 P.2d 1353 (Ct. App. 1977).
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defendant to double jeopardy.3 °3 Under Sandoval, the court must deter-

mine whether one offense is a necessarily included lesser offense, 3°0 or
30 5

whether the same evidence would sustain a conviction for either offense.
In Gammil, the court held that State v. DeMary3 °6 now requires courts
to apply these tests in light of the particular facts and circumstances of
each case. 30 7 Mechanical comparison of the elements of each offense is
no longer sufficient. Vacating the sentence for aggravated battery, the
court found that the defendant had "committed the robbery and aggravated battery by one act. "308 Because the aggravated battery offense,
under the facts of the case, did not have any element not included in
the robbery offense, and because the robbery could not have been committed without9 the commission of the lesser offense, the two offenses
3
had merged.
In State v. Espinosa,10 the supreme court rejected the defendant's
argument that he was subjected to double jeopardy by the imposition

of two separate enhancements for the use of a firearm on two criminal
counts.3 ' Espinosa was convicted of kidnapping with a firearm, false
imprisonment with a firearm, attempted armed robbery, and felony
murder.31 2 Relying upon State v. Ellis,3 3 Espinosa argued that the trial
court erred by imposing two firearm enhancements for two of the
crimes, rather than only one for the entire series of crimes.31 4 The
supreme court held that both case law 3 5 and statutory
303. Gammil, 108 N.M. at 209, 769 P.2d at 1300 (citing Sandoval, 90 N.M. 260, 561 P.2d 1353).
304. Id. The court must compare the statutory elements of each crime to determine whether one
is lesser-included. Sandoval, 90 N.M. at 262, 561 P.2d at 1355.
305. Gammil, 108 N.M. at 209, 769 P.2d at 1300. Under the same evidence test, if the evidence
offered in support of one offense would support a conviction for the other offense, double jeopardy
applies. Id.; Sandoval, 90 N.M. at 262, 561 P.2d at 1355.
306. 99 N.M. 177, 655 P.2d 1021 (1982).
307. Id. at 210, 769 P.2d at 1301.
308. Id. at 210, 769 P.2d at 1301. Cf. State v. Williams, 105 N.M. 214, 730 P.2d 1196 (Ct.
App. 1986)(the court upheld as distinct two charges against the defendant for kidnapping by holding
for services and assault with attempt to commit criminal sexual penetration as distinct, so that
merger did not apply; State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1986)(the court upheld
multiple counts on the basis that the elements of general fraud were not necessarily involved in a
charge of fraudulent securities practice).
In Gammil, the court stated that the remedy for cases involving merger is to vacate the sentence
and not the conviction. 108 N.M. at 210, 769 P.2d at 1301.
309. Gammil, 108 N.M. at 210, 769 P.2d at 1301. As a practical matter, the robbery and the
assault involved one continuous action, not to be confused with a "single transaction." The defense
of a single criminal transaction has been discredited in New Mexico. See State v. Tanton, 88 N.M.
333, 336, 540 P.2d 813, 816 (1975). In Sandoval, the court rejected the argument that because the
defendant had to shoot the victim to obtain her purse, only one criminal transaction had occurred.
Sandoval, 90 N.M. at 263, 561 P.2d at 1356.
310. 107 N.M. 293, 756 P.2d 573 (1988).
311. Id. at 297-98, 756 P.2d at 577-78.
312. Id. at 294, 756 P.2d at 574.
313. 88 N.M. 90, 537 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1975). ("Where convictions on two or more counts
in a single trial are based on a unified course of events, the convictions count as one under [the
prior law] § 40A-29-3.1(C) 1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6.").
314. Espinosa, 107 N.M. at 294, 297, 756 P.2d at 574, 577.
315. Id. at 297-98, 756 P.2d at 577-78 (quoting State v. Kendall, 90 N.M. 236, 244, 561 P.2d
935, 943 (Ct. App.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 90 N.M. 191, 561 P.2d 464 (1977)(rejecting
the single criminal transaction test and holding "[i]f the statute punishes for 'use' of a firearm in
committing a felony, the punishment is to be applied for each felony committed by using a firearm.")).
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law 16 had changed since the court had decided Ellis.31 7 In Espinosa, the
supreme court overruled Ellis in so far as it conflicted
with State v.
31 8

Kendall and affirmed both enhancement sentences.
XI. SIXTH AMENDMENT
During the survey period, the courts clarified
trial analysis,3 19 examined the defendant's right
and during communications between judge and
the interaction between the right
to be present
322

impartial, and unanimous jury.

sixth amendment speedy
to be present at trial3 20
jury, 32' and focused on
and the right to a fair,

23
A. Right to Speedy TriaP
In State v. Sanchez,324 the court of appeals clarified when a defendant's

sixth amendment right to a speedy trial attaches. Sanchez was arrested,
booked, and released without any restrictions on January 19, 1986.325 He
was not charged until nineteen months later, when he was indicted for
326
trafficking by possession with intent to distribute controlled substances.
Sanchez moved to dismiss the indictment as a violation of his right to
a speedy trial because of the nineteen-month delay between his arrest
and his indictment, claiming that his sixth amendment327right to a speedy

trial was triggered by the arrest, not the indictment.

The court held that arrest can only trigger a defendant's federal speedy

trial right when there has been a formal indictment or information, or
when there has been an arrest and holding to answer.3 2 The court
distinguished cases in which the defendant had suffered an "impairment
of liberty" (such as a bond or other restriction) or lived under a "cloud
of unresolved criminal charges. 329 Holding that without such restrictions,

316. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1987), the current firearm enhancement statute,
provides that a basic sentence may be enhanced by one year if the court or the jury finds that a
firearm was used in the commission of a non-capital felony. For a second or subsequent non-capital
felony, the basic sentence may be increased by three years. Neither of these enhancements may be
suspended or deferred.
317. Espinosa, 107 N.M. at 297, 753 P.2d at 577.
318. Id. at 298, 756 P.2d at 578. See supra note 315.
319. State v. Sanchez, 108 N.M. 206, 769 P.2d 1297 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 197,
769 P.2d 731 (1989); State v. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. 411, 773 P.2d 356 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108
N.M. 318, 772 P.2d 352 (1989).
320. State v. Clements, 108 N.M. 13, 765 P.2d 1195 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785,
765 P.2d 758 (1988).
321. State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 760 P.2d 1276 (1988).
322. Id.
323. For a discussion of other speedy trial issues, see supra notes 31-87 and accompanying text.
324. 108 N.M. 206, 769 P.2d 1297 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 197, 679 P.2d 731 (1989).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. (citing Ibarra v. Municipal Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 853, 208 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1984)).
329. Id. (citing Kilpatrick v. State, 103 N.M. 52, 702 P.2d 997 (1985)).
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defendant's speedy trial rights were not triggered by arrest, the court
affirmed the convictions.330
In State v. Tartaglia,33' the court of appeals addressed the burden of
proof of the Barker v. Wingo33 2 factors for the first time in New Mexico.
Tartaglia was indicted for possession of heroin, valium, and drug paraphernalia on March 12, 1985 while he was incarcerated on unrelated
charges.333 The prosecution had sent a notice to his home address, then
issued a bench warrant for his arrest. When Tartaglia was released in
May 1985, neither he nor the prison authorities were aware of the
outstanding warrant. He was finally
arrested on February 26, 1987 and
4
arraigned on March 6, 1987.11
When analyzing a speedy trial claim, the court must balance four
factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) assertion of the
right to speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant as a result of
the delay.335 In Tartaglia, the court held that it is the defendant's burden
to prove all but the reason (i.e., the justification) for the delay. 33 6 Further,
the defendant must show 3the
prejudice to him as a result of the delay
7
as an independent factor.
The length of the delay is merely a triggering device which is "presumptively prejudicial" and serves as a screen by which meritless claims
may be filtered out.

38

The court need not inquire into the other three

Barker factors if the defendant does not establish the "presumptively
prejudicial" delay.33 9 Whether the delay is presumptively prejudicial is
determined primarily by "the nature and complexity of the crime involved."4°

The main issue in Tartaglia concerned the defendant's contention that
the presumption of prejudice from the delay should carry over into the
fourth and most critical of the Barker factors, the prejudice caused by
the delay to the defendant's case. 4' While stating that the defendant

330. Sanchez, 108 N.M. at 207, 769 P.2d at 1298. If the sixth amendment right is not triggered
by the arrest, and there is a prejudicial delay between arrest and indictment, the defendant may
claim a due process violation under the fourteenth amendment. See State v. Lewis, 107 N.M. 182,
754 P.2d 853 (Ct. App. 1988) and supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
331. 108 N.M. 411, 773 P.2d 356 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 318, 772 P.2d 352 (1989).
332. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Barker is the leading case outlining the analysis of claims of constitutional
speedy trial violations.
333. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. at 413, 773 P.2d at 358.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 414, 773 P.2d at 359 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. 514).
336. Id. at 414, 773 P.2d at 359. In State v. Zurla, 29 N.M. Bar Bull. 330, 333 (1990), the
supreme court overruled Tartaglia to the extent that it suggests that the state does not have the
burden of persuasion to show that defendant's speedy trial right has not been violated.
337. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. at 416, 773 P.2d at 361.
338. Id. at 415-16, 773 P.2d at 360-61.
339. Id. at 415, 773 P.2d at 360 (citing State v. Kilpatrick, 104 N.M. 441, 722 P.2d 692 (Ct.
App. 1986)).
340. Id. at 414, 773 P.2d at 359 (citing Kilpatrick). Whether or not the defendant caused or
contributed to the delay claimed to be prejudicial is a threshold consideration. State v. Tarango,
105 N.M. 592, 734 P.2d 1275 (Ct. App. 1987).
341. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. at 415, 773 P.2d at 360. The state conceded that the other factors
weighed in the defendant's favor.
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need not show "actual prejudice,

3 42

the court insisted that the defendant

must show "specific corroboration of his contention of prejudice," in-

dependent from the evidence of the length of the delay itself. 43 The
presumption of prejudice because of a lengthy delay "does not function
' 4

or summarily answer the separate factor of prejudice to a defendant."

After enunciating this principle, the court remanded to allow the defendant
to attempt to show specific evidence of prejudice.3 45 The court cautioned,
however, that the defendant need only present some evidence; he does
not have to actually prove prejudice. 3 "
B. Right to be Present
In State v. Clements,3 47 the court of appeals held that the defendant
was denied his constitutional right to be present. 3" The defendant failed
to appear during his trial in Roswell after he had gone to Albuquerque

to bring back a witness. Defense counsel requested a continuance until
the next day so that the defendant could be present. Before granting the
continuance, however, the court ordered the defendant to turn himself

in to the Bernalillo County Detention Center and wait there until he
could be returned to Roswell. The court suggested that if the defendant
3 49
complied, the court would consider continuing the trial.
Although the defendant immediately turned himself in, the court did
not grant the continuance. Instead, the court allowed the state's four

rebuttal witnesses to testify and removed a juror.350 Defense counsel

preserved the error with continuing objections. 5'
The court of appeals first addressed the issue of whether the defendant
had waived his right to be present. A defendant may waive this con-

342. Id. at 416, 773 P.2d at 361. Actual prejudice is any circumstance which can be shown to
have prevented the defendant's otherwise successful defense. Id. (citing State v. Duran, 91 N.M.
756, 581 P.2d 19 (1978)); see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
343. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. at 416, 773 P.2d at 361. The court argued that the defendant must
put forth some evidence so that the state can knowledgeably rebut the defendant's claim of prejudice.
Id. at 415, 773 P.2d at 360.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 417, 773 P.2d at 362. The court remanded rather than affirmed the conviction because
it found that the defendant had reasonably relied on prior, yet ultimately distinguishable,case law.
Id. (citing State v. Kilpatrick, 104 N.M. 441, 722 P.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Mascarenas,
84 N.M. 153, 500 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1972)). Prejudice may be shown by oppressive pretrial
incarceration, by defendant's anxiety and concern caused by the delay, and, most importantly, the
impairment of the defense caused by the delay. Id. at 415, 773 P.2d at 360 (citing Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)).
346. Id.
347. 108 N.M. 13, 765 P.2d 1195 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 765 P.2d 758 (1988).
348. Id. at 17, 765 P.2d 1199. Under the confrontation clause, U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI, and the
due process clause, amend. XIV, as embodied in Sup. CT. RUtLEs ANN. 5-612(A) (Recomp. 1986)
(N.M. R. Crim. P.), the defendant's presence is required "at every stage of trial."
349. Clements, 108 N.M. at 15, 765 P.2d at 1197.
350. Id. at 16, 765 P.2d at 1198. The prosecutor advised the court that two of the state's rebuttal
witnesses might not be available if the trial was delayed. However, the prosecutor and the witnesses
never made any attempt to confirm their plans or the time when they would be unavailable. Id.
351. Id.
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stitutional right if he voluntarily absents himself from trial. 5 2 The court
found that the defendant's absence was voluntary until he entered detention in Alabuquerque.3 53 At that point, his absence became involuntary
a4
because he was told the trial would not be continued until he returned,
was and he no longer waived his right.355
The court then set forth a balancing test trial courts must use to
determine whether or not to proceed with trial in the defendant's absence.
The court must balance "defendant's right of confrontation, and the
possible prejudice which may ensue from his absence, against the time,
expense, and inconvenience occasioned by his absence." 35 6 The trial court's
decision to proceed will not be reversed unless it is erroneous.357 Even
if the decision is erroneous, the state has the burden to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that "the denial of a defendant's guaranteed right
of confrontation of witnesses against him, or his presence during jury
selection . . . was harmless. ' 358 In this case, the defendant was not absent
voluntarily, the trial court did not weigh all relevant factors, and the
state had not offered to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that it
was harmless error to conduct the trial without the defendant.3 9 Therefore,
the court remanded for a new trial.3 6
C. Right to Fair and Impartial Jury and to a Unanimous Verdict of
Twelve Jurors
In State v. Escamilla,3 6 t the supreme court reaffirmed that defendants
have a fundamental right to a fair and impartial jury which includes the
352. Id. at 17, 765 P.2d 1199. The right to be present is codified for the New Mexico District
Courts in Criminal Procedure Rule 5-612. That rule states in part:
A. Presence required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the
time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impanelling of the jury
and the return of the verdict and the imposition of any sentence, except as otherwise
provided by this rule.
B. Continued presence not required. The further progress of the trial, including
the return of the verdict, shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered
to have waived his right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present:
(1) voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced (whether or not he
has been informed by the court of his obligation to remain during the trial); or
(2) engages in conduct which is such as to justify his being excluded from the
courtroom.
SuP. Cr. RUEs ANN. 5-612 (Recomp. 1986)(emphasis added).
To clarify the meaning of the phrase "voluntarily absents himself," the court considered interpretations of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is the same as the New
Mexico rule. Clements, 108 N.M. at 17, 765 P.2d at 1199. Generally, if a defendant is voluntarily
absent, he has freely, knowingly, and intelligently waived his presence. See Hovey v. State, 104
N.M. 667, 670-71, 726 P.2d 344, 347-48 (1986).
353. Clements, 108 N.M. at 19, 765 P.2d at 1201.
354. Id.
355. Id. The state argued that the defendant's absence could not change from voluntary to
involuntary regardless of the detention. The court avoided deciding this question by analyzing whether
the defendant's rights were violated even if his absence were voluntary.
356. Id. at 19, 765 P.2d at 1201.
357. Id. A decision will be erroneous ifthe defendant reasonably could have been prejudiced by
the absence. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. The trial court, for example, did not consider whether it was proper for the two other
rebuttal witnesses to testify. Id.
360. Id.
361. 107 N.M. 510, 760 P.2d 1276 (1988).
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right to a unanimous verdict of twelve jurors.3 62 The court also examined
the defendant's right to be present during jury communications and the
3 63
trial court's responsibility to record those communications.
During jury deliberations at Escamilla's trial, the jurors told the bailiff,

who told the judge, that one juror did not understand English. The judge

responded that he knew the juror and the juror did, in fact, understand
English. The judge did not conduct a hearing but simply instructed the
jury to continue deliberating. Ultimately, the jurors translated for the

non-English speaking juror.3 6

The defendant and his counsel were unaware of the problem.3 65 However, counsel became aware before the jury reached its verdict that there

was a juror who could not understand the deliberations.36 After the jury
rendered a verdict of guilty, the defendant moved for a mistrial. The
3 67
trial court denied the motion.
Because the defendant did not preserve the error, but a fundamental
right was involved, the supreme court needed to decide whether the
defendant waived the right, and if he did, whether fundamental error
was involved. 3 " The defendant had waived his right to a fair, impartial,
and unanimous jury by "gambling on the verdict. 3 69 However, because
the trial court also violated the defendant's right to be present during

communications, and never
made a record of those communications, the
3 70
supreme court remanded.

362. Id. at 515, 516, 760 P.2d at 1281, 1282. In New Mexico these rights are grounded in the
sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and in article 2, sections 12, 14, and 18, of
the New Mexico Constitution. See Mares v. State, 83 N.M. 225, 226, 490 P.2d 667, 668 (1971);
State v. Holloway, 106 N.M. 161, 164, 740 P.2d 711, 714 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 405,
744 P.2d 180 (1987); State v. Gallegos, 88 N.M. 487, 488-89, 542 P.2d 832, 833-34 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 89 N.M. 6, 546 P.2d 71 (1975).
363. Escamilla, 107 N.M. at 515-16, 760 P.2d at 1280-81. A defendant has the right to be present
during communications with the jury pursuant to Sup. CT. RutEs ANN. 5-610(D) (Recomp. 1986).
Hovey v. State, 104 N.M. 667, 726 P.2d 344 (1986)(interpreting New Mexico Rule of Criminal
Procedure 43(D), the predecessor to Rule 5-610(D)). Rule 610(D) states:
Communications between the judge and the jury may be made in writing without
recalling the jury after notice to the attorneys and an opportunity for objection.
Unless requested by counsel for the defendant, communications not relating to
issues of the case at trial may be made without recalling the defendant.
The committee commentary to the rule states that "[aill communications between the judge and
the jury should be made a part of the record, whether made in the presence of defense counsel
and defendant or not." Agreeing with the commentary, the Escamilla court held that the rule
creates an independent duty by the trial court to create a record and make a ruling. Escamilla,
107 N.M. at 515, 516, 760 P.2d at 1281, 1282.
364. Escamilla, 107 N.M. at 518, 760 P.2d at 1279.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 515, 760 P.2d at 1281. Although the record showed that counsel knew during the
time of deliberation about the non-English speaking juror, the record did not show that counsel
knew about the communications with the judge. Id.
367. Id. at 518, 760 P.2d at 1279.
368. Id. at 515, 760 P.2d at 1281. Fundamental error cannot be waived. Id. (citing State v.
Sanchez, 58 N.M. 77, 84, 265 P.2d 684, 688 (1954)).
369. Id. (citing State v. Costales, 37 N.M. 115, 19 P.2d 189 (1933)). In Costales, the court held
"that the size of a juror's vocabulary, or the extent of his ability to understand English, are not
proper subjects of inquiry after the verdict is rendered." 37 N.M. at 118, 19 P.2d at 191.
370. Escamilla, 107 N.M. at 515-16, 760 P.2d at 1281-82.
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The court directed the trial court to certify the record as to the details
of the communications and to hold a hearing for the state to attempt
to rebut the presumption of prejudice which necessarily arose from the
defendant's absence from the communications.3 7' The supreme court also
directed the trial court to determine at the hearing whether the defendant's
right to a "jury of twelve" was violated.172 However, even if the trial

court found prejudice to the defendant from his absence, or from the
jury irregularity, the court had discretion not to grant a new trial if the
court found that there was no fundamental error and that the defendant
had waived his rights.373
XII. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Aguilar v. State,

74

the supreme court addressed the issue of whether

a confession was involuntary and therefore invalid under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. The defendant had an IQ of approximately 70, and had recently been diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic
and treated at the New Mexico State Hospital. 3 7 He was arrested for
the burglary of a hardware store. After reading the defendant his Miranda
rights, the Chief of Police,
who knew the defendant, encouraged him
3 76
to confess to the burglary.

371. Id. at 516, 760 P.2d at 1282. See Hovey, 104 N.M. at 670, 726 P.2d at 347 ("[A] presumption
of prejudice arises whenever such an improper communication occurs, and the State bears the burden
of rebutting that presumption by making an affirmative showing on the record that the communication
did not affect the jury's verdict.").
372. Escamilla, 107 N.M. at 516, 760 P.2d at 1282.
373. Id. A defendant can waive fundamental rights if the trial court ensures that the waiver was
made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Hovey, 104 N.M. at 670-71, 726 P.2d at 347-48.
The mandate for the trial court, therefore, appeared to be to ascertain whether the defendant
actually knew about the communcations and the non-English speaking juror and actually decided
not to raise the issue.
By giving the trial court discretion to find fundamental error, even if the defendant had waived
his rights, the supreme court was applying an expansive definition of fundamental error. The doctrine
of fundamental error is applied only "under exceptional circumstances and solely to prevent a
miscarriage of justice." State v. Tipton, 73 N.M. 24, 26, 385 P.2d 355, 357 (1963). Courts have
often defined "miscarriage of justice" narrowly to mean the conviction of an obviously innocent
defendant. See State v. Sanders, 54 N.M. 369, 379, 225 P.2d 150, 160 (1950); State v. Padilla,
104 N.M. 378, 721 P.2d 1309 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 378, 721 P.2d 1309 (1986). On
the other hand, fundamental error also has been defined more broadly as an "error [that] goes to
the foundation of the case or take[s] from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense
and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." State v. Garcia, 46 N.M. 302, 309,
128 P.2d 459, 462 (1942). Since the issues in Escamilla involved fundamental rights, not guilt or
innocence, the court must have adopted the latter, broader definition. However, in State v. Clark,
108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 291 (1989), discussed in Part XIII infra,
that broad definition was rejected. Justice Ransom, who authored the Escamilla decision, dissented
in Clark. Id. at 313-17, 772 P.2d at 347-51.
374. 106 N.M. 798, 751 P.2d 178 (1988).
375. Id. at 799, 751 P.2d at 179.
376. Id. at 798-99, 751 P.2d at 178-79. Chief Barela implied to the defendant that the authorities
would treat him better if he confessed, and that if he did not confess he might be charged with
other unrelated crimes. The Chief also stated that the police had found Aguilar's fingerprints at
the scene, even though these were never produced into evidence at the trial. Id. at 799, 751 P.2d
at 179.
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The trial court refused to suppress this confession on grounds of
involuntariness, and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court
reversed.3 77 Reaffirming the "totality of the circumstances test, 3 78 the
court determined that the court of appeals in its independent review
79
focused only on evidence that supported a finding of voluntariness
The supreme court relied on the three phase analytical framework
established in Culombe v. Connecticut. 0 The first phase involves an
examination of the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession.
In the second phase, the court must infer how the accused reacted to
those circumstances. Finally, the court must apply due process standards
to their findings.381 Due process requires that the confession must have
3 2
been freely given and not induced by apparent promises or threats. 1
The state bears the burden of proving
by preponderance of the evidence
33
that the confession was voluntary
The court held that the "implied threats and promises, especially when
knowingly made to a defendant with diminished mental capacity, rendered
the confession involuntary as a matter of law.' '384 The state failed to
meet its burden of proving that under all the circumstances the confession
was voluntary because the accused "unquestionably had difficulty in
appreciating the meaning of the assurances given
to him . . . and in
35
distinguishing whether a deal had been made.1
XIII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT, CAPITAL SENTENCING,
FUNDAMENTAL ERROR: STATE V. CLARK
A. Introduction
In State v. Clark, 38 6 the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed a death
sentence. Clark, who pled guilty to kidnapping and first degree murder ,387

377. Id. at 798, 751 P.2d at 178.
378. Id. at 799, 751 P.2d at 179 (citing State v. Tindle, 104 N.M. 195, 718 P.2d 705 (Ct. App.
1986); State v. Aguirre, 91 N.M. 672, 579 P.2d 798 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580
P.2d 972 (1978)).
379. Id. at 799, 751 P.2d at 179.
380. Id. (citing Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)).
381. Id. at 799-800, 751 P.2d at 179-80.
382. Id. at 800, 751 P.2d at 180 (citing Tindle, 104 N.M. at 198, 718 P.2d at 708).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. The court noted that as interrogators become more skilled in psychological persuasion,
the mental condition of the defendant has become a significant factor in assessing voluntariness.
Id. (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)).
386. 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 291 (1989).
The New Mexico Supreme Court substantially lessened Clark's impact on New Mexico death
sentencing hearings-without, however, expressly overruling Clark-in State v. Henderson, 29 N.M.
Bar Bull. 342 (1990). See infra notes 398, 460, and 471.
387. Clark, 108 N.M. at 290, 772 P.2d at 324. Clark based his decision to plead guilty partly
on representations by Governor Anaya that the governor would commute any death sentence imposed
on Clark. Id. at 291, 772 P.2d at 325. The trial court accepted Clark's guilty plea but declined
to conduct the sentencing hearing before Governor Anaya's term of office expired. Id. The trial
court afterwards denied Clark's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 292, 772 P.2d at 326.
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argued that his rights were violated in several ways during his sentencing
proceeding. The court recognized that the record was fraught with error
but nevertheless refused to reverse Clark's death sentence because no
error rose to the level of "fundamental error," rendering fatal Clark's
failure to object to the errors at the time of the proceeding.
Clark argued that the trial court deprived the jury of mitigating information by refusing to pronounce sentence on his kidnapping conviction
before the jury considered the penalty for his murder conviction. 8 8 He
also argued that the jury was presented with prejudicial and irrelevant
argument and testimony during the proceeding. This included emotional
testimony from the victim's mother,38 9 prosecutorial argument weighing
the value of Clark's life against the victim's life, 319 testimony about the
possible length 9' and expense3 92 of Clark's incarceration, and prosecutorial
comment on Clark's failure to testify.3 93 Clark argued that even if none
of these alleged errors warranted reversal standing alone, the accumulation
of error deprived him of a fair trial.3 9 Clark also challenged the validity
of the statutory aggravating circumstance of "murder of a witness to a
crime," 3 95 and the admission of his criminal record to prove that the
category applied to him.3 9 Finally, Clark challenged the jury instructions
given at the sentencing hearing, arguing that their description of the
jury's role in analyzing aggravating and mitigating circumstances violated
3a
the eighth amendment .
B. Order of Sentencing
The supreme court held that the potential period of confinement of
a capital defendant is not a mitigating circumstance under the eighth
amendment.398 At the sentencing proceeding Clark had requested that the

The supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for
withdrawal. The court reasoned that Clark made his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily, that he
did not assert his innocence, that he had assistance of counsel, and that he waited two and onehalf months before seeking the withdrawal. Id. The supreme court held that Governor Anaya's
representations did not affect the voluntariness of Clark's plea, noting that Clark told the trial
court that he had made his decision to plead guilty before he learned of the possibility of a
commutation. Id. The court also noted that Clark persisted in proffering the plea after the trial
court informed him that it would not hold the sentencing hearing before Governor Anaya's term
ended. Id. at 292-93, 772 P.2d at 326-27.
The court also held that absence of prejudice to the prosecution is not sufficient grounds to
permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn. Id. at 292, 772 P.2d at 326.
388. Id. at 293, 772 P.2d at 327. See infra notes 398-417 and accompanying text.
389. Id. at 298, 772 P.2d at 332. See infra notes 418-23 and accompanying text.
390. Id. at 299, 772 P.2d at 333. See infra notes 424-30 and accompanying text.
391. Id. See infra notes 436-42 and accompanying text.
392. Id. at 300, 772 P.2d at 334. See infra notes 443-48 and accompanying text.
393. Id. at 301, 772 P.2d at 335.
394. Id. at 311, 772 P.2d at 345. See infra notes 452-55 and accompanying text.
395. Id. at 304, 772 P.2d at 338. See infra notes 456-62 and accompanying text.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 306, 772 P.2d at 340. See infra notes 463-67 and accompanying text.
398. Id. at 294, 772 P.2d at 328. But see State v. Henderson, 29 N.M. Bar Bull. 342, 343-44
(1990). In Henderson, the court distinguished Clark, stating:
In Clark, we held that it is not error for the trial court to refuse to impose sentence
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judge sentence him for his kidnapping conviction before the jury considered his sentence for murder so that the jury might consider the term
of imprisonment imposed as a "mitigating factor."' 3 9 Clark argued that
a long prison term would reduce his future dangerousness.4
The trial court ruled that it could not sentence Clark on the kidnapping
charge before the jury's capital sentencing decision.4' Instead, the trial
court allowed defense counsel to inform the jury what options were open
to the court under the Criminal Sentencing Act.4 2 Clark argued on appeal
that he had a constitutional right under Lockett v. Ohio 4°3 and Skipper
v. South Carolina,4 to have the jury informed of his kidnapping sentence
45
in order to firmly fix the time when he might become eligible for parole. 0
He argued that the court's failure to impose the kidnapping sentence
prior to the jury's death penalty decision unnecessarily enlarged the range
of sentences potentially available and confused the jurors about the effect
of their verdict.4
The supreme court rejected Clark's argument. The court declared that
mitigating circumstances are facts about the defendant's character or

for the noncapital offenses before the the capital sentencing phase if the jury is
instructed on the range of sentences available and if the jury is allowed to consider
that range as a mitigating circumstance (always, at the defendant's request). We
now hold that it is error to refuse an instruction . . . pertaining to the meaning
of a life sentence. We further hold that the court should, if requested, either impose
sentence on the collateral noncapital offenses or give the range of sentences on
those offenses as in Clark.
See infra text accompanying note 460. Id. at 344 (emphasis in original).
Although the permissibility of the government raising the issue of pardon or parole has been
widely discussed, see Annotation, Prejudicial Effect of Statement or Instruction of Court as to
Possibility of Parole or Pardon, 12 A.L.R.3d 832, §§ 3, 4 (1967 and Supp. Aug. 1989); Annotation,
PrejudicialEffect of Statement of Prosecutor as to Possibility of Pardon or Parole, 16 A.L.R.3d
1137, §§ 3, 4 (1967), the question of whether a defendant in a capital sentencing proceeding may
raise the term of future incarceration as a mitigating factor has received less attention. Two courts
have recently addressed this issue. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that a state statute allowed
the defendant to present evidence of the length of future incarceration even though the Maryland
courts had held that such evidence is irrelevant to the consideration of future dangerousness. Doering
v. State, 313 Md. 384, 545 A.2d 1281 (1988). The South Carolina Supreme Court stated in dictum
that because a statute denying parole to convicted murderers implicated neither future dangerousness
nor the defendant's character, it would be inadmissible in a capital sentencing hearing. State v.
Matthews, 296 S.C. 379, 373 S.E.2d 587 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1559 (1989).
399. Clark, 108 N.M. at 293, 772 P.2d at 327.
400. Id. at 293, 772 P.2d at 327. Clark's exposure at the time of his capital hearing included a
basic eighteen-year sentence for kidnapping. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
The trial court had discretion, after a hearing on mitigating or aggravating circumstances, to increase
or decrease the basic sentence by as much as six years. Id. The trial court also had discretion to
decide whether the sentence was to be served concurrently or consecutively with the twenty-fouryear sentence imposed for Clark's previous conviction for kidnapping and sexual penetration of a
minor. Id. § 31-18-21 Finally, the basic sentence was subject to a one-year enhancement for the
use of a firearm and a one-year enhancement under the habitual offender statute. Id. §§ 31-1816(A) and -17(B).
401. Clark, 108 N.M. at 293, 772 P.2d at 327.
402. Id.
403. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (defendant must be allowed to present all mitigating evidence at death
penalty proceeding).
404. 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (defendant's past good behavior in prison is relevant to the consideration
of his future dangerousness and is therefore a "mitigating circumstance").
405. Clark, 108 N.M. at 294, 772 P.2d at 328.
406. Id. at 293, 772 P.2d at 327.
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background, or circumstances of the particular offense, that may call
for a penalty less than death.407 The court interpreted Skipper v. North
Carolinato mean that the evidence of the defendant's past good behavior
in prison was admissible as character evidence, stating:
It is the defendant's own conduct and background that is the source
of mitigating evidence regarding his potential for future dangerous
behavior that the jury must be allowed to consider. The sentencing
prerogatives of the trial judge, or the possible length of a life sentence,
simply have no relevance under eighth amendment standards as they
have developed so far. 40
Thus, the relevant distinction is whether or not the inhibition against
future dangerousness arises from the character of the defendant.
The court noted that evidence of the judge's opinion on issues relevant
to sentencing-here, Clark's degree of culpability for the kidnappingmight impermissibly prejudice the defendant.409 The court stated that "[it
is almost universally accepted that a trial judge should not express or
otherwise indicate to the jury an opinion on whether a defendant is guilty
of criminal charges. ' ' 410 Even in the present circumstance, where guilt
was not at issue and Clark himself decided that the information was
potentially mitigating, the court found the41 trial judge's decision to delay
non-capital sentencing to be appropriate.
Chief Justice Sosa and Justice Ransom dissented from the majority's
holding. The chief justice stated that the eighth amendment requires that
the court allow the sentencing body to consider as a mitigating factor
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record. 4 12 The defendant's
record would include any past sentence and any concurrent or consecutive
sentence arising out of the case before the capital jury. 4 3 Chief Justice
Sosa stated that "[w]hat is essential is that the jury have before it all
possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate
it must determine. ' 41 4 The chief justice would have found that the trial
court committed
fundamental error because it failed to give this infor415
mation.
Justice Ransom agreed with Chief Justice Sosa in a separate dissent.
"I am firmly convinced that under eighth amendment jurisprudence the
defendant was entitled to have the jury apprised of [non-capital sentencing]

407. Id. at
Skipper, 476
605).
408. Id. at
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at
413. Id.
414. Id. at
415. Id.

294-95, 772 P.2d at 328-29 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987);
U.S. at 4; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at
295, 772 P.2d at 329.

312, 772 P.2d at 346 (citing Locket, 438 U.S. 586).
313, 772 P.2d at 347 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1004 (1983)).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Spring 1990)

information. '

41

6

Justice Ransom agreed with the chief justice that the

length of incarceration may mitigate the aggravating circumstance of
future dangerousness and act as an independent mitigating circumstance. 4 7
C. Propriety of Testimony and Fundamental Error
Clark challenged the propriety of testimony by the victim's mother on

eighth amendment grounds.4 1 s Clark argued that the mother's testimony

was not relevant to his blameworthiness and created the possibility that
4 19
the jury imposed the death sentence in an impermissibly arbitrary manner.
The supreme court held that the mother's testimony was relevant to the
aggravating circumstance that Clark kidnapped her daughter before killing
her.4 20 The testimony was also directly related to the circumstances of
the crime itself.4 21 Finally, the court noted that the mother's testimony
422

"contained none of the elements proscribed in Booth v. Maryland:
descriptions of the character and reputation of the victim; descriptions
of the emotional impact of the crime upon the victim's family; and
opinions3 of the victim's family characterizing the crime or the defendant.' '
The court also denied that the government violated the Booth standards
when the prosecution suggested in closing argument that the victim's life
42

was worth at least Clark's life.424 The United States Supreme Court held

in Booth that a jury in a death sentencing proceeding may not consider
the victim's personal characteristics.4 2 Clark argued that the prosecution's
argument impermissibly focused the jury's attention on the personal
characteristics of his victim. 4

26

The supreme court, however, characterized

416. Id. at 315, 772 P.2d at 349 (Ransom, J., dissenting) (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604) (jury
must be allowed to consider any circumstance of the offense that supports the imposition of a
sentence less than death)).
417. Id. at 315-16, 772 P.2d at 349-50 (citing Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1003 (because capital jury is
concerned that the defendant may be returned to society, information about parole is relevant to
its decision whether to impose the death penalty); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986)
(evidence that defendant would not be dangerous if incarcerated must be considered potentially
mitigating)).
418. Id. The victim's mother testified about the circumstances of her daughter's disappearance
and about the efforts the mother and others made to find her. Id.
419. Id. (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (evidence of the impact of the crime
on the victim's family inadmissible)).
420. Id. at 299, 772 P.2d at 333 (citing N.M. STAT. ArN. § 31-20A-1(C) (1978) ("In the sentencing
proceeding, all evidence admitted at the trial shall be considered and additional evidence may be
presented as to the circumstances of the crime and as to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances
• . .")). The fact of the kidnapping permitted the inference that Clark killed the victim because
she was a witness to a crime. See id. at 304, 772 P.2d at 338. Murder of a witness to a crime,
in order to prevent the witness from reporting or testifying to the crime, is an aggravating circumstance
permitting the imposition of the death sentence. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 (1978).
421. Clark, 108 N.M. at 299, 772 P.2d at 333 ("[G]uilty pleas and stipulated facts are no substitute
for the evidence of a crime to be considered by a jury.").
422. 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987).
423. Clark, 108 N.M. at 299, 772 P.2d at 333.
424. Id. at 300, 772 P.2d at 334.
425. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
426. Clark, 108 N.M. at 298, 772 P.2d at 332 (citing Booth, 482 U.S. 496 (jury in death sentencing
proceeding may not consider personal characteristic of the victim)).
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the argument as a plea for retribution, an acceptable basis for imposing
the death penalty and a permissible subject for prosecutorial argument.4 27
The court noted, moreover, that innocence and defenselessness were the
only characteristics brought to the jury's attention. 42 The court held these
4 29
characteristics to be "generic to children" and not personal to the victim.

Choice of a class of victim, the court noted, is a circumstance
of the
430
crime that Booth does not bar the jury from hearing.
Clark argued that several errors at his sentencing hearing required
reversal in spite of the fact that he did not object to them at the hearing.
The court held that Clark's failure to timely object constituted a waiver
of each claim.4 1 The court denied that the "greater degree of scrutiny"
accorded capital appeals 43 2 required the court to relax the timely objection
rule. 433 The court further denied that any of the errors that Clark alleged
for the first time on appeal constituted "fundamental error. ' 43 4 Fundamental error warrants review regardless of whether the defendant timely
35
objects.

4

Clark argued that it was error for the government to present testimony
and argument about the length of a life sentence and the possibility of
parole. 43 6 The court, having already held that the possible length of time
the defendant will spend in prison is immaterial to capital sentencing
proceedings,437 stated that it was error to place the issue of Clark's
eligibility for parole before the jury.4 8 The court held, however, that the
error did not rise to the level of reversible fundamental error because
the fundamental error doctrine does not apply when the defendant creates
the error by his own actions, 43 9 and Clark had raised the issue of sentencing

427. Id. at 300, 772 P.2d at 334 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05 n.7).
431. Id. at 296, 772 P.2d at 330 (citing State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 760 P.2d 1276
(1988)(claims of error involving even fundamental rights are subject to waiver) (discussed supra
notes 361-73 and accompanying text); State v. Tafoya, 94 N.M. 762, 764, 617 P.2d 151, 153 (1980);
State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 502, 612 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1980); State v. Casteneda, 97 N.M. 670,
678, 648 P.2d 1129, 1137 (Ct. App. 1982) (failure to timely object bars review of the issue on
appeal)).
432. Id. at 296-97, 772 P.2d at 330-31 (quoting State v. Compton, 104 N.M. 683, 688, 726 P.2d
837, 842, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986)).
433. Id. at 297, 772 P.2d at 331 (citing State v. Cheadle, 101 N.M. 282, 287, 681 P.2d 708,
713 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 945 (1984)).
434. See infra notes 451-53 and accompanying text.
435. Clark, 108 N.M. at 296, 772 P.2d at 330 (citing State v. Compton, 104 N.M. 683, 687,
726 P.2d 837, 841, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986); State v. Ramirez, 98 N.M. 268, 269, 648
P.2d 307, 308 (1982)).
436. Id. at 295, 772 P.2d at 329.
437. See supra notes 408 and accompanying text.
438. Clark, 108 N.M. at 297, 772 P.2d at 331. The vast majority of jurisdictions hold that the
possibility of parole or pardon is admissible in capital sentencing proceedings. See Annotation,
Prejudicial Effect of Statement or Instruction of Court as to Possibility of Parole or Pardon, 12
A.L.R.3d 832, §§ 3, 4 (1967 and Supp. Aug. 1989); Annotation, PrejudicialEffect of Statement
of Prosecutor as to Possibility of Pardon or Parole, 16 A.L.R.3d 1137, §§ 3, 4 (1967).
439. Clark, 108 N.M. at 298, 772 P.2d at 332 (citing State v. Padilla, 104 N.M. 446, 449-51,
722 P.2d 697, 700-02 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 378, 721 P.2d 1309 (1986)).
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in his case-in-chief." 0 The court also noted that cross-examination is
permitted on the subject matter of direct examination,"' and that the
42
government is generally entitled to respond to the defendant's argument."

Clark also argued, and the court agreed, that it was error for the
government to inquire into the cost of incarcerating Clark."

3

Clark's

failure to object at trial waived the issue, however, and the court held
that no fundamental error occurred." Significantly, the court analogized
the instant context-the evaluation of the degree of death-worthiness-

with the usual fundamental error context of a trial of guilt or innocence." 5
One presently accepted standard for evaluating a claim of fundamental
error is whether "the defendant's innocence appears indisputable or if
the question of his guilt is so doubtful that it would shock the conscience
to permit the conviction to stand."
The court held that the standard
for a capital sentencing hearing-where the question of guilt is a foregone

conclusion-is "whether there is a reasonable possibility that any error

changed the outcome of the sentencing hearing. '" 7 The court held that
the brevity of the government's improper argument kept it from being
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal."8
Clark argued that the government committed reversible error by commenting to the jury on Clark's failure to explain certain details of his
crime. The court held that the government's actions were improper," 9
but refused to reverse the death sentence because there was no fundamental
error. 4 0 The court concluded that there was "no probability that the

440. Id. at 297, 772 P.2d at 331.
441. Id. at 298, 772 P.2d at 332 (citing Sup. CT. RuLEs ANN. 11-611 (Recomp. 1986)).
442. Id. (citing State v. Muise, 103 N.M. 382, 392, 707 P.2d 1192, 1202 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
103 N.M. 287, 705 P.2d 1138 (1985)).
443. Id. at 300, 772 P.2d at 334.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 301, 772 P.2d at 335. For a criticism of this approach, see Comment, Deadly Mistakes:
Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 740 (1987).
446. Clark, 108 N.M. at 301, 772 P.2d at 335 (citing State v. Manlove, 79 N.M. 189, 441 P.2d
229 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 79 N.M. 159, 441 P.2d 57 (1968)).
447. Id. (citing Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293 (11th Cir. 1986) (The capital sentencing proceeding
was not rendered "fundamentally unfair" by impermissible prosecutorial comments. The court
analyzed the effect of the remarks under the "prejudice prong" of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984) (whether, but for the impermissible comment, the jury's sentence would
have been different).).
448. Id. (citing Tucker, 802 F.2d at 1293; Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985),
sentence vacated, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570 (1986), judgment reinstated, 809 F.2d 700, cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1987)).
449. Id. at 302-03, 772 P.2d at 336-37 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (fifth
amendment prohibits direct or indirect comments on the defendant's failure to testify)). The court
adopted a new standard to evaluate allegedly improper prosecutorial comments, "whether the language
used was manifestly intended to be or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and
necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." Id. at 302, 772 P.2d
at 336 (citing Hearn v. Mintzes, 708 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. White, 444
F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 949 (1971); Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d
168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955); McCracken v. State, 431 P.2d 513, 517 (Alaska 1967); State v. Lincoln,
3 Haw. App. 107, 125, 643 P.2d 807, 819 (1982); State v. Hunter, 29 Wash. App. 218, 220, 627
P.2d 1339, 1342 (1981)).
450. Id. at 303, 772 P.2d at 337.
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error was a significant factor in the jury's
deliberations in relation to
'45
the rest of the evidence before them." '
The court again used the test of whether alleged error changed the
outcome of the jury's decision in evaluating Clark's argument that even
if none of the alleged individual errors rose to the level of fundamental
error, the cumulative effect of the errors required reversal as accumulated
fundamental error. 4 2 The court found that there was no reasonable
45
probability that the errors claimed changed the result of the hearing. 1
In dissent, Chief Justice Sosa noted that the various errors committed
by the government presented the jury with "bewildering testimony" and
left it with the apparent choice of having Clark executed or releasing
him onto the streets. 4 4 Justice Ransom would have found that fundamental
error arose during the proceeding:
A substantial portion of Clark's death penalty hearing was devoted
to evidence and arguments on the possibility of commutation or
pardon, parole, the costs of incarceration, and legislative or judicial
actions that could impact the sentence of life imprisonment. The
majority opinion concedes this was inconsistent with the decisionmaking role that the legislature set out for the jury. It is clear to
me that the jury had to be in complete and utter confusion over the
choice they were to make, and I believe this constituted a miscarriage
of justice in the sentencing
proceeding. Any miscarriage of justice is
455
fundamental error.

D. Aggravating Circumstances-Murderof a Witness
Clark argued that the statutory "murder of a witness" aggravating
circumstance 456 is overbroad if it includes cases where murder follows
45 7
another crime against the same victim.
The court considered the reasoning behind the provision and concluded
that the aggravating circumstance of murder of a witness allows the jury
to consider the motive for the murder. The court held that the class of
murders is adequately narrowed for eighth amendment purposes when it

451. Id. The court offered no authority for this statement, which echoes the language of Fahy
v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). Fahy set the standard for determining when federal constitutional
error may be considered "harmless," and therefore not requiring reversal. Id. at 86-87. In Chapman
v. California, the United States Supreme Court tightened up the Fahy test, holding that "before
a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
452. Clark, 108 N.M. at 311, 772 P.2d at 345.
453. Id. (citing State v. Hamilton, 89 N.M. 746, 751, 557 P.2d 1095, 1100 (1976)). Hamilton
did not, however, address the issue of fundamental error in the present context of a death penalty
hearing.
454. Id. at 313, 772 P.2d at 347 (Sosa, C.J., dissenting).
455. Id. at 314, 772 P.2d at 348 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
456. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(G) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
457. Clark, 108 N.M. at 304, 772 P.2d at 338 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)
("[A]n aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of murder."); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)).
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is limited to murders committed to avoid prosecution. 4 5 The court further
held that the state's interest in preventing felons from killing
their victims
45 9
to avoid prosecution reasonably justifies a death sentence.
The court rejected Clark's argument that the government "double
counted" the fact that he kidnapped his victim before killing her, counting
it both as the separate crime of kidnapping and as an aggravating
circumstance to murder./ The court held that "[t]he requirement that
the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the motive for the killing
was the elimination of a potential witness sufficiently distinguishes a
killing of this type from other killings committed during the commission
of a kidnapping." 46 1 One consequence of the court's holding is that it
rendered permissible the introduction by the government of evidence of
Clark's prior conviction for kidnapping and criminal sexual penetration
62
for the limited purpose of showing Clark's motive for the killing.
E. Standards for the Jury
The court held that Clark was not prejudiced by the jury instructions
given at the hearing, 463 noting that the eighth amendment does not require
specific legal standards for balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances.4 Clark argued that the jury instructions required the jury
to find unanimously that a statutory aggravating circumstance existed
beyond a reasonable doubt before imposing the death penalty, but that
the jury was not provided with a legal standard for weighing aggravating
circumstances against mitigating circumstances.4 5 Clark argued that the
instructions discouraged the jury from fully considering nonstatutory
mitigating factors./ The court rejected this argument, stating, "We adhere
to the view that a specific written list of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances is not required where the instruction given indicates that the
list of enumerated factors is not exclusive." 467
F. Mills Error
In Mills v. Maryland,46s the United States Supreme Court remanded
for resentencing because a substantial probability existed that a juror

458. Id. (citing Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, 1103, reh'g granted, 828 F.2d 1497 (1987),
opinion on reh'g, 844 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1988) (sentence affirmed); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d
1086, 1110 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983)).
459. Id.
460. Id. at 305, 772 P.2d at 339. But cf. State v. Henderson, 29 N.M. Bar Bull. 342, 345 (1990)
(where the crimes of kidnapping and rape are factually inseparable, jury may not consider aggravating
circumstance of murder during the commission of a kidnapping).
461. Clark, 108 N.M. at 305, 772 P.2d at 339.
462. Id. at 304-05, 772 P.2d at 338-39.
463. SuP. Cr. RutLs ANN. 14-7028 and -7030 (Recomp. 1986) (N.M. U.J.I. Crim.).
464. Clark, 108 N.M. at 307, 772 P.2d at 341 (citing Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320
(1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 876 n.13; State v. Cheadle, 101 N.M. 282, 287, 68! P.2d
708, 713 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 945 (1984)).
465. Id. Clark argued that this rendered his sentence unreliable. Id.
466. Id. at 306, 772 P.2d at 340.
467. Id. (citing People v. Free, 94 I11.2d 378, 69 I11. Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 865 (1983); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890 (1986);
State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981)).
468. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
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could have thought he was precluded from considering any mitigating
evidence unless all the jurors agreed that a particular circumstance existed.469 Clark argued that the jury instruction given at his sentencing
hearing 1 violated the principles established in Mills. 470 The court disa47
greed.
The court held that the dangers presented by the Maryland verdict
form in Mills are not present in New Mexico. The Maryland form required
the sentencing jury to make specific findings that a particular mitigating
circumstance either existed or did not exist, and that this circumstance
had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 472 Clark's jury was
instructed that they must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the aggravating circumstances existed, and that any finding they
reached regarding the appropriate sentence must be unanimous.4 73 The
jury instruction stated: "[i]f you find an aggravating circumstance, you
must consider all mitigating circumstances. A mitigating circumstance is
any conduct, circumstance or ' thing
which would lead you to decide not
474
to impose the death penalty.
JANET KINNIRY
WILL O'CONNELL
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469. Id. at 384.
470. Clark, 108 N.M. at 309-10, 772 P.2d at 343-44.
471. Id. at 310, 772 P.2d at 344. In State v. Henderson, the supreme court held that a death
sentencing jury should be instructed that "it need not unanimously find the existence of a mitigating
circumstance before considering it." 29 N.M. Bar Bull. 342, 347 (1990) (citing Mills, 486 U.S. 367).
The court said, "We disapprove of any language in Clark to the contrary." Id.
472. Clark, 108 N.M. at 309, 772 P.2d at 343.
473. Id.
474. Id. (quoting Sup. CT. RutLEs ANN. 14-7029 (Recomp. 1986)).

